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Resumo 
 
Diariamente tomamos decisões complexas que requerem tempo e esforço que não 
podemos despender. Compreender como decidimos em ambientes ambíguos com recursos 
cognitivos limitados torna-se essencial para todos nós. Este trabalho surge da intersecção da 
Psicologia e Neurociência, analisando a tomada de decisão cooperativa. O objectivo é 
analisar como diferentes níveis de glicemia influenciam a cooperação depois de um evento 
crítico. Aqui, a crise é operacionalizada como uma crise de recursos num dilema social. Esta 
investigação torna-se a primeira a explorar a relação entre glucose e cooperação pós-crise. 
A nossa amostra consiste em 47 adultos voluntários de ambos os géneros, recrutados 
através do método de amostragem snowball. Usámos uma tarefa commons dilemma com duas 
condições de perigo de extinção de recurso (High vs Low Danger) e manipulámos os níveis 
de glicemia dos participantes administrando uma bebida rica em ou sem açúcar. Desta forma, 
a experiência consistiu num design factorial 2 Glucose (glucose vs placebo) x 2 Danger 
(High vs Low), inter-sujeitos. 
Os dados sugerem que participantes com níveis mais elevados de glucose sanguínea 
são mais cooperativos num contexto pós-crise (e não antes) e principalmente quando há 
maior perigo de extinção de recursos (condição High Danger). Estes resultados implicam que 
a glucose sanguínea influencia processos de tomada de decisão, replicando estudos 
anteriores; e que pode influenciar as decisões cooperativas em alguns contextos. Assim, 
sugerimos que níveis de glicemia mais baixos estão associados a uma redução dos recursos 
cognitivos o que promove um processamento cognitivo intuitivo, estimulando o uso de certas 
heurísticas sociais. 
Sugerimos que investigações futuras analisem quais as heurísticas sociais mais 
salientes em diferentes cenários pós-crise, sob diferentes níveis de glicemia. A combinação 
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de métodos da Psicologia, Neurociência e Computação, integrando assim diferentes áreas da 
Ciência Cognitiva, permitirá continuar a expandir o nosso conhecimento sobre a tomada de 
decisão cooperativa. 
 
Palavras-chave: cooperação humana, dilema social, crise, glucose, recursos cognitivos, 
heurísticas 
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Abstract 
 
Daily we face complex decisions that require time and effort that we do not possess. 
Understanding how we make decisions in uncertain environments with limited cognitive 
resources becomes essential to all of us. The present work arises from the intersection of 
Psychology and Neuroscience, focusing on cooperative decision-making. The goal is to 
examine how much we cooperate after a critical event, under different glycemic levels. Here, 
the crisis is operationalized as a crisis of resources in a social dilemma paradigm. This 
research becomes the first to explore the connection between glucose and post-crisis 
cooperation.  
Our sample comprises 47 volunteer adults from both genders, recruited through 
snowball sampling. We used a commons dilemma task, with two post-crisis conditions of 
resource depletion (High vs Low Danger) and manipulated participants’ blood glucose levels 
by administering either a sugar-rich or a no-sugar drink. Thus, the experiment consisted in a 2 
Glucose (glucose vs. placebo) x 2 Danger (High vs. Low) factorial design, between subjects.  
Results suggest participants with higher blood glucose levels are more cooperative 
only in a post-crisis context (and not before) and mainly under greater danger of resource 
depletion (High Danger condition). Our findings do not imply a direct causal link between 
brain glucose and cooperation but instead that blood glucose levels influence decision-
making processes, replicating previous studies; adding it can influence cooperative decision-
making in some contexts. We propose lower blood glucose levels are associated with lower 
cognitive resources that, in turn, promote an intuitive processing type, boosting the use of 
certain social heuristics.  
We suggest that future research addresses which social heuristics are more salient in 
different post-crisis scenarios, under different glycemic levels. Combining methods from 
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Psychology, Neuroscience and Computation, thus integrating different areas of Cognitive 
Science, could expand our understanding of cooperative decision-making. 
Keywords: human cooperation, social dilemma, crisis, glucose, cognitive resources, 
heuristics 
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Resumo alargado 
 
Diariamente somos confrontados com decisões complexas que requerem tempo e 
esforço que não podemos despender. Compreender como tomamos decisões em ambientes 
ambíguos com recursos cognitivos limitados torna-se essencial para todos nós. O presente 
trabalho surge da intersecção de duas áreas da Ciência Cognitiva, Psicologia e Neurociência, 
analisando o processo cognitivo de tomada de decisão sob a forma de cooperação. A 
cooperação é essencial para a nossa sociedade, especialmente em momentos de crise. Por 
essa razão, o objectivo deste projecto consiste em examinar o quão cooperamos após um 
evento crítico, sob diferentes níveis de glicemia. Uma das principais premissas deste trabalho 
é a associação entre o nível de glicemia e recursos cognitivos, sendo que se espera que níveis 
inferiores de glucose no sangue estejam associados a uma redução de recursos cognitivos. 
Esta ideia é suportada pela diminuição de capacidades cognitivas em consequência de níveis 
mais baixos de glucose (e.g. Feldman & Barshi, 2007). O evento crítico é operacionalizado 
sob a forma de crise de recursos, através de um dilema social. Assim, esta investigação torna-
se a primeira a explorar a relação entre glucose e cooperação pós-crise.  
 Definimos cooperação um comportamento que maximiza ganhos comuns (Vohs & 
Baumeister, 2007). Para estudar a cooperação humana temos de começar por compreender os 
mecanismsos que permitiram que esta emergisse. Rand & Nowak, (2013) propõem 5 
mecanismos através dos quais a cooperação é seleccionada pela natureza, todos eles 
beneficiando o actor, quer directa ou indirectamente, quer a curto ou longo-prazo, 
favorecendo assim uma perspectiva de cooperação como fenómeno egoísta. Herbert Simon 
propôs um outro mecanismo em adição aos anteriores para explicar a emergência da 
cooperação: docilidade humana, explicada com base no altruísmo. Altruísmo é um 
comportamento que tem sempre um custo para o actor e beneficia um outro (West, Griffin, & 
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Gardner, 2007) e, assim, a cooperação altruísta envolve sempre um custo. Já a docilidade é 
definida como a tendência humana de aprender através dos outros, a nossa receptividade à 
influência social sem completa avaliação, o que pode aumentar a nossa fitness (Simon, 1990). 
Esta perspectiva já sugere uma base altruísta para a cooperação, pois os altruístas tendem a 
exibir este traço de docilidade. O altruísmo pode, assim, ser seleccionado pois a docilidade 
permite que os altruístas tenham maior fitness que os egoístas, na medida em que esta 
promove a aprendizagem social. Esta aprendizagem tem grandes vantagens para os 
indivíduos dóceis, nomeadamente a aquisição de conhecimentos, skills e comportamentos 
úteis no dia-a-dia. Este mecanismo da docilidade sugere, assim, que estamos predispostos a 
cooperar porque adquirimos este comportamento através da aprendizagem social, sem 
completa avaliação dos benefícios e prejuízos que esta nos pode trazer. 
 Aceitação sem completa avaliação é uma noção central para o mecanismo da 
docilidade. Mas porque tomamos decisões tão importantes, como cooperar ou não, sem uma 
avaliação cuidada? Isto ocorre porque a nossa racionalidade tem limites. Muitas vezes não 
temos tempo nem capacidade cognitiva para lidar com problemas complexos e, ao invés de 
recorrer a um raciocínio cuidado, usamos atalhos mentais chamados heurísticas. Estas 
heurísticas são regras gerais que nos permitem decidir com base em pouca informação, que 
por vezes nos induzem em erro mas frequentemente nos permitem chegar a uma boa solução 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). O uso de heurísticas corresponde ao uso do sistema intuitivo, 
da perspectiva da teoria do processamento dual da cognição. De acordo com esta, temos dois 
sistemas de processamento: 1) intuitivo, que é rápido e automático; 2) deliberativo, que é 
lento, custoso e controlado (Kahneman, 2003). As heurísticas, especificamente heurísticas 
sociais, parecem promover a cooperação. De acordo com a Social Heuristic Hypothesis 
(SHH), que se baseia no modelo dual da cognição, nós seres humanos cooperamos 
intuitivamente e apenas deliberando é que tomamos uma decisão no próprio interesse (Rand 
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et al., 2014). A cooperação intuitiva terá surgido da generalização de heurísticas sociais 
(respostas automáticas e vantajosas) que desenvolvemos nas nossas interacções sociais 
diárias. 
 Para analisar a cooperação, especificamente num contexto pós-crise, optámos por usar 
como paradigma um dilema de recursos – commons dilemma,. Neste tipo de dilemas, várias 
pessoas têm acesso a um conjunto de recursos (por exemplo, peixes num oceano, árvores 
numa floresta) e podem tirar tantos itens quanto quiserem até um dado limite. Tal como no 
mundo real, este recurso regenera-se periodicamente, permitindo que se vá retirando itens de 
forma sustentável. Contudo, se tirarmos demasiado (overharvesting), o recurso extingue-se e 
enfrentamos uma crise de recursos. Assim, surge o dilema: todos querem ter o máximo de 
itens possível mas para evitar que o recurso se extinga e poder continuar a retirar, temos de 
nos restringir. Há diversas variáveis individuais e situacionais que influenciam a cooperação 
neste tipo de dilemas, contudo, não existem estudos sobre quão cooperamos depois de uma 
crise, pelo que apenas podemos tentar antecipar com base na literatura existente.  
 Já expostas as bases teóricas acerca da cooperação humana e apresentado o paradigma 
escolhido para a estudar, resta compreender de que forma é que a glucose pode influenciar a 
cooperação. Actualmente não há estudos sobre a relação entre a glucose e a cooperação, 
apenas sobre o efeito da glucose na tomada de decisão. A glucose é o principal substrato 
energético do cérebro e, dado que este não a consegue sintetizar, a glucose tem de ser 
transportada pela corrente sanguínea para suportar a actividade neuronal cerebral. 
Consequentemente, quando estamos num estado hipoglicémico (quantidade de açúcar no 
sangue inferior ao normal) o nosso cérebro opera de forma diferente. Parece que menores 
níveis de glucose no sangue estão associados a uma redução das capacidades cognitivas 
superiores tais como atenção, memória de trabalho e controlo executivo (Feldman & Barshi, 
2007). Ademais, até alterações relativamente subtis nos níveis de glucose podem ter um 
  
xii 
 
impacto mensurável no pensamento e comportamento (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007) e ainda 
antes de atingir um estado hipoglicémico já se verifica uma redução de algumas capacidades 
cognitivas (McElroy, Dickinson, & Stroh, 2014). No que respeita os efeitos da glucose na 
tomada de decisão, uma meta-análise recente revelou que menores níveis de glucose estão 
associados a uma maior risk seeking, maior future discounting e a um estilo de 
processamento mais intuitivo (Orquin & Kurzban, 2016). Com base nesta evidência 
prevemos que indivíduos com maiores níveis de glucose sejam mais cooperativos na nossa 
tarefa experimental. 
 A nossa amostra consiste em 47 adultos voluntários de ambos os géneros, recrutados 
através do método de amostragem snowball. Usámos o programa FISH 5.0, um commons 
dilemma em que peixes num oceano representam o recurso. A tarefa consiste em 3 etapas. Na 
1ª etapa o recurso decai lentamente, podendo chegar à 10ª ronda. Numa 2ª etapa surge uma 
crise, o recurso extingue-se muito cedo (3ª ronda). Numa 3ª etapa, temos 2 condições pós-
crise, inter-sujeitos: uma em que o recurso decai lentamente (Low danger, semelhante à 1ª 
etapa); uma em que o recurso decai mais rapidamente (High Danger). Além das duas 
condições pós-crise (High vs Low Danger), manipulámos também os níveis de glucose 
sanguínea dos participantes administrando uma bebida rica em açúcar ou sem açúcar. Desta 
forma, a experiência consistiu num design factorial 2 Glucose (glucose vs placebo) x 2 
Danger (High vs Low), inter-sujeitos. 
 Os dados sugerem que os participantes com níveis mais eleveados de glucose 
sanguínea são mais cooperativos num contexto pós-crise (e não antes) e principalmente 
quando há maior perigo de extinção de recursos (condição High Danger). Estes resultados 
não implicam uma ligação directa e causal entre os níveis de glucose no cérebro e cooperação 
mas sim que a glucose sanguínea influencia processos de tomada de decisão, replicando 
estudos anteriores; e que pode influenciar as decisões cooperativas em alguns contextos. 
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Assim, sugerimos que níveis de glicemia mais baixos estão associados a uma redução dos 
recursos cognitivos o que, por sua vez, promove um processamento cognitivo intuitivo, 
estimulando o uso de certas heurísticas sociais. Especulamos que o grupo placebo do nosso 
estudo tenha seguido a heurística de imitate the successful: que procuremos pela pessoa mais 
bem sucedida e imitemos o seu comportamento (Gigerenzer, 2008). Como o objectivo da 
tarefa era ter o máximo de pontos no final, pensamos que os participantes consideraram que o 
jogador mais bem sucedido era o que tinha mais pontos (mais ganancioso) e guiaram o seu 
comportamento pelo dele. 
 Terminamos este trabalho sugerindo que investigações futuras analisem quais as 
heurísticas sociais mais salientes em diferentes cenários pós-crise, sob diferentes níveis de 
glicemia. Através da combinação de métodos da Psicologia, Neurociência e Computação e 
assim integrando diferentes áreas da Ciência Cognitiva, poderemos continuar a expandir o 
nosso conhecimento sobre a tomada de decisão cooperativa. 
 
Palavras-chave: cooperação humana, dilema social, crise, glucose, recursos cognitivos, 
heurísticas 
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Introduction 
 Nowadays we are constantly faced with complex decisions, which require time and 
effort that we do not possess. Most of our decisions take place in the social realm and among 
these we are specifically interested in cooperative decision-making. Cooperation is a pillar of 
our society, either in a large scale such as cooperation between nations or multinational 
companies; or in a smaller scale, with family members, friends and even strangers. There are 
several individual and situational variables that influence human cooperative behavior and we 
are specifically interested in cooperation after a critical situation. A crisis is an event that results 
in unstable and dangerous situation, affecting an individual, group, community or even the 
whole society. 
 We face several crisis in the current days such as the economic, politic and social crisis, 
several natural catastrophes, among others. Let us take the example of natural catastrophes. 
The closer we are or feel towards the victims of these catastrophes, the more likely we are to 
aid them. The Americans who volunteered to help during the California floods (Yurieff, 2017), 
the 12,5 million donated  by the Portuguese to the victims of the Pedrogão wildfire (“Donativos 
de Pedrógão,” 2017) and the 14 billion US dollars donated to the victims of the 2004 Indian 
Ocean earthquake and tsunami (Falk, 2013). These are just a few examples of large-scale 
cooperation after a crisis. However, some catastrophes received less media coverage and 
elicited less help such as the recent floods in India. Therefore, even when the crisis is evident, 
our response is not always to cooperate. Cooperation often comes with cost.  
Another crisis we face, and perhaps a more silent one, is resource crisis. If we consume 
a natural renewable resource at a higher rate than the Earth is able to replenish it, the resource 
will be in danger of depletion. A report from 2008 (almost a decade ago) revealed we humans 
are using 30% more resources than the Earth can replenish each year, leading to deforestation, 
degraded soils, polluted air and water, and dramatic declines in numbers of fish and other 
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species (Jowit, 2008). To study human cooperation after a crisis in the laboratory, we will use 
a resource crisis simulation. 
What factors influence human decision-making in terms of cooperation after a crisis? 
Common sense says that the particularities of the situation and our cultural background and 
values will probably have a strong impact. In other words, cooperating or not will depend on 
the situation and the individual. Another less evident variable is our current mental state. Our 
mental or cognitive state, such as being distracted, confused or curious, clearly influences how 
we process information and how we make decisions. Imagine a friend calls you asking you to 
help him move in. Whether you are feeling mentally exhausted or rested will probably 
influence your decision to help or not. Therefore, it is natural that our current cognitive state 
affects how we make decisions, namely, our decision to cooperate with others.  
One factor that greatly influences our cognitive state and ability is our blood glucose 
levels (Orquin & Kurzban, 2016). This is not surprising since the brain cannot synthetize 
glucose, its main energy source (Mergenthaler, Lindauer, Dienel, & Meisel, 2013), requiring 
virtually a continuous supply of glucose from the circulation (Cryer, 2007). Just think of 
occasions when there have been several hours since your last meal and you feel like you are 
not thinking straight. Even in healthy individuals, blood glucose levels vary plenty throughout 
the day, although they rarely experience episodes of hypoglycemia (Desimone & Weinstock, 
2000; Rooijackers, Wiegers, Tack, van der Graaf, & de Galan, 2016). Considering our brain 
function relies on glucose as fuel and we experience large glycemic variability, we recognize 
our brain function and decision-making abilities may vary with our glucose levels. Having this 
evidence in mind, we arrive to the research question behind this project: How different blood 
glucose levels influence human cooperation after a crisis? 
The relevance of answering this question goes beyond fundamental research. Since 
cooperative behavior is a basic element of society and its individuals, understanding what 
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influences our decision to cooperate or not; or to what degree we cooperate is essential to 
promote this behavior. Moreover, the post-crisis context is of particular relevance, since a crisis 
implies something went wrong in the past and we need to work together and adapt, 
implementing a different strategy for the future. Although there is no denying that one’s social 
values are of major importance, our blood glucose levels could potentially be very pertinent in 
determining cooperative behavior, even more so after a crisis. During the day, our glucose 
levels fluctuate and we are not always at the top of our reasoning abilities when we face new 
and complex problems. Many of these situations require deliberation and cooperation to reach 
a good solution. Thus, studying cooperative behavior under different glucose levels in critical 
situations is relevant for all individuals. This is particularly significant for those with stressful 
jobs such as police officers, firefighters, airline pilots and military personnel.  
This project arises from an intersection between two areas of Cognitive Science, 
Psychology and Neuroscience, with decision making as the cognitive process of interest. 
Decision-making is framed as how much should I cooperate, to be studied through a social 
dilemma. The contribution from Neuroscience stems from the field of neuroenergetics, which 
has mainly focused on the role of glucose in neural function. The contribution of Psychology 
comes from the study of cooperative behavior in a group context, a topic of interest in social 
psychology.  
 The literature review supporting this thesis comprises three chapters. We begin by 
analyzing how human cooperation emerged, its underlying mechanisms and the theoretical 
framework offered by the Social Heuristic Hypothesis. The second chapter centers on the 
paradigm we will use to study human cooperation– the commons dilemma – a social dilemma. 
Here we focus on the individual and situational variables that influence our behavior in such 
contexts and try to anticipate how much we cooperate after a crisis. After describing the 
theoretical framework on human cooperation and presenting the paradigm used to study it, we 
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move on to understand how glucose can influence cooperation in humans. Therefore, the third 
and final chapter begins by describing how glucose is metabolized by the brain, how it 
influences decision-making and how it may influence cooperative behavior. We close this 
review by raising our hypothesis, followed by the method and results sections. Finally, we 
discuss our data, present the study’s limitations and give some directions for future research.   
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I. Theoretical background 
1. Emergence of human cooperation 
What is cooperation? 
Answering this question has been proven difficult. In evolutionary theory, cooperation  
is a behavior that benefits the recipient and may or may not be costly to the actor (West et al., 
2007), with benefits referring to increases in reproductive success – fitness – of the recipient.  
Fitness is not defined by how much an organism lives but instead by the expected number of 
offspring of an organism or, in other words, by the probability of successful reproduction (Mills 
& Beatty, 1979). From the perspective of the social sciences, cooperation belongs to a class of 
prosocial behaviors, that is, voluntary actions that are intended to help or benefit another 
individual or group of individuals (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989), such as helping, sharing, 
volunteering and cooperating (Tomasello, 2009). Cooperation is defined by social psychology 
as the tendency to maximize outcomes for self and others, as “doing well together” (Vohs & 
Baumeister, 2007). A more precise definition of cooperation is as behaviors that are beneficial 
to the recipient, but can be either beneficial or costly to the actor (West et al., 2007) 
 
It is possible to observe cooperation in different species, being a widespread 
phenomenon both within and between species (Melis & Semmann, 2010). In humans, we can 
find several examples of cooperation in our daily life. When we are at work, we cooperate with 
our colleagues to produce a desirable outcome – e.g. deliver the project within the deadline. 
Cooperation occurs at a larger scale when, for example, countries cooperate by forming 
alliances to promote counter-terrorism, by sharing intelligence, developing joint military tactics 
and law enforcement, etc. 
However, we also observe several examples of competition. As with cooperation, we 
can see competition from two angles. From the perspective of social sciences we define 
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competition as the tendency to maximize relative advantage over others, as “doing better than 
others” (Vohs & Baumeister, 2007). From the lenses of evolutionary theory we define it as 
behaviors that benefit the self but harm others. as interactions where the presence of one 
individual lowers the reproductive success – fitness – of another (West et al., 2007). 
There is a long history of us humans competing for resources such as food, water and 
territory. These days, those resources are accessible in most developed countries and we 
compete for other valuables like jobs, housing, social status, etc. There is also competition in 
a larger scale, between countries for economic growth and national security.  
 
 Now we arrive at an intriguing question: in situations where each individual has an 
incentive to be selfish and compete, how did cooperation ever develop? This problem was 
posed some decades ago by Axelrod in 1984 and was portrayed as the cooperation paradox: 
under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without any central 
authority?  In other words, how can we sustain cooperation without any authority to enforce it, 
when there is great benefit in competing? To answer this seemingly paradoxical phenomenon 
we need to analyze how cooperation emerged.  
 
Emergence of cooperation 
We will present some evidence on the mechanisms underlying cooperative behavior 
that may tempt the reader to accept the idea that cooperation is ultimately a selfish 
phenomenon. Later, we demonstrate that cooperation can be a reflection of pure altruism and 
that this trait was selected by nature. 
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a. Cooperation as egoism 
Natural selection actually opposes the evolution of cooperation unless specific 
mechanisms operate: direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, spatial selection, multilevel 
selection, and kin selection (Rand & Nowak, 2013). 
  The mechanism of direct reciprocity arises if the same two individuals have repeated 
interactions. This mechanism is based on the idea that subject A may pay the cost of 
cooperating with subject B today to earn reciprocal cooperation of B in the future. Indirect 
reciprocity on the other hand, emerges if there are repeated encounters within a population 
and third parties observe or can find out about them. The information that subject C is 
cooperative may spread across the population through communication, building a good 
reputation for C that will increase the likelihood of reciprocation in the future. A good 
reputation also enhances the likelihood of access to sexual partners and resources (Van Lange, 
Balliet, Parks, & Van Vugt, 2014a). 
Another mechanism is spatial selection. Since individuals interact with those around 
them, clusters of cooperators can emerge, even if surrounded by defectors/competitors (Rand 
& Nowak, 2013). This clustering increases the likelihood of cooperators interacting with other 
cooperators, making them earn higher payoffs/rewards than defectors. When there is intragroup 
and intergroup competition, defectors may win within groups but groups of cooperators may 
outperform groups of defectors. This process of multilevel selection results in the selection of 
cooperators. Finally, cooperation also emerged through kin selection, which relates to the 
concept of inclusive fitness. Our organisms seek to maximize inclusive fitness, which is the 
combination of increasing the reproduction of our current body - direct fitness – or increasing 
the reproduction of other bodies that carry a copy of ourselves – indirect fitness (Van Lange et 
al., 2014a). We can see this in terms of a gene trying to propagate copies of himself 
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Taken together, the previous mechanisms provide good reasons for the natural selection 
of cooperation and, therefore, why we observe this apparently paradoxical behavior across 
species. These mechanisms all share the premise that individuals always benefit from 
cooperation, directly or indirectly, in a short or long-term. Hence, they are all forms of selfish 
or strategic cooperation, since the cooperators’ goal is his/her own benefit. 
 
From the above examples, we might be tempted to accept human nature is necessarily 
selfish. That we only cooperate because we expect some return and that cooperation is a 
strategic and a self-interest act. However, how could we explain cooperative behavior when 
there is no benefit to the self, at no point in time? For example, how can this view account for 
people who risk their lives to help a stranger? In a recent TED Talk, Abigal Marsh answered 
this question by saying there are genuinely altruistic behaviors and presented compelling 
neurobiological evidence supporting this idea (Marsh, 2016). For the time being let us consider 
altruism as voluntary, costly behavior motivated by the desire to help another individual.  
It seems that the brains of altruistic people are fundamentally different in three 
characteristics: facial emotion recognition, amygdala activity and size. Altruists are better at 
recognizing fearful expressions, which are social cues that elicit compassion and desire to help. 
This recognition is mediated by the amygdala complex, which is a part of the neural circuitry 
critical for emotion, having a role in emotional reactivity and learning, among other functions 
(Gallagher & Chiba, 1996). Not surprisingly, altruists also display higher amygdalar reactivity 
to fearful stimuli and a larger amygdala than average (by approximately 8%). Conversely, the 
brain of psychopaths, who lack compassion and desire to help others, operates in the other side 
of the spectrum. Unlike altruists, psychopaths have poorer recognition of fearful expressions, 
their amygdala is under reactive to fear stimuli and is smaller than average (by 18-20%). 
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Now that we have presented evidence that cooperation is not always selfishly motivated 
and that real altruism exists, we have still not explained the mechanism that underlies the 
selection of cooperation through altruism. Adding to the previous five mechanisms for the 
selection of cooperation, Herbert Simon proposed another mechanism that adds to the previous 
ones – docility. For Simon, cooperation can also be an altruistic behavior, not necessarily a 
selfish one.  
 
b. Cooperation as altruism 
Altruism is a behavior that is always costly to the actor and beneficial to the recipient 
(West et al., 2007). For the purposes of understanding cooperation, we are interested in the 
definition of altruism that stems from genetics. Let us consider altruism the behavior that 
increases, on average, the reproductive fitness of others at the expense of the fitness of the 
altruist (Simon, 1990). Therefore, we conclude selfish individuals have higher fitness than 
altruists will. If altruism, by definition, reduces the fitness of the individual, how can this 
behavior be selected? Simon argues that even though it reduces the fitness of the altruist, it can 
increase the average fitness of society.  
This theory accounts for altruism on the basis of docility: the human tendency to learn 
from others, our receptivity to social influence. Herbert’s main argument is that docility can 
actually increase our fitness. As we shall explore further, there are many times where we do 
not make rational decisions because there is neither time nor processing power to do so. Given 
this limited rationality, docility encourages individuals to adopt culture-transmitted behaviors, 
such as cooperation, without evaluating how much these behaviors contribute to their personal 
fitness. Acceptance without full evaluation is at the core of this docility mechanism, Simon 
says. One example of this docility mechanism is many of us are willing to accept less 
cholesterol would be beneficial to our health, without reviewing clinical studies on the matter.  
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Previously it was mentioned that selfish individuals have higher fitness than altruists 
simply because altruism comes with a cost to the self. Nevertheless, docility allows altruists to 
have higher fitness than selfish individuals. Docile individuals are prone to social learning, and 
this has two main contributions to their fitness: 1) provides knowledge and skills that are useful 
in daily life; 2) and passes “proper behaviors” such as goals, values and attitudes, which lead 
to supportive responses from others. Social learning prevents docile individuals from 
“reinventing the wheel”, rendering their learning more efficient and making a massive 
contribution to their fitness. As long as the cost of altruism that society imposes on docile 
individuals is smaller than the knowledge and skills acquired from docility, altruists will have 
higher fitness than selfish individuals will. In sum, this leads to the conclusion that we are 
predisposed to cooperate because we acquire this behavior from social learning without giving 
it much thought. 
 
Before going any further, we need to understand something that is at the core of the 
docility mechanism, which is acceptance without full evaluation. Why would we make 
important decisions – such as whether to cooperate or not – without careful reasoning? If we 
did, it would cost us too much time and effort. In addition, there is a faster and sometimes more 
efficient alternative. 
 
Bounded rationality 
Social environments often involve complexity and uncertainty and we are frequently 
constrained by lack of information and limited cognitive resources, since our brain has finite 
processing power. Even we had quantum computing processing abilities, there is no way we 
could possibly make “the optimal decision” for all decisions in our day to day. 
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The classic idea that we are strictly rational beings striving for optimization has long 
been abandoned. Nowadays, it is widely accepted that we not always decide by reasoning, 
resorting instead to intuition. Here intuition is a process that allows problem solving without 
awareness or with incomplete awareness of the process that lead to the solution (Polič, 2009). 
We can relate to this feeling by recalling situations where the solution comes to us without 
much thought or deliberation. This processing mode can be beneficial since it is effortless and 
time-saving but can also lead us to make mistakes.  
The distinction between these two types of cognitive processes - intuition and reasoning 
- was labeled as System 1 and System 2 (Stanovich & West, 2000). Later, Kahneman, (2003) 
proposed a dual system view of cognition that differentiated these two styles of processing. 
System 1 (intuition system) is fast, automatic, effortless, associative and difficult to control. 
System 2 (reasoning system) is much slower, serial, effortful, rule-governed and deliberately 
controlled.  
The intuition system is associated with heuristics, a type of processing or a mental 
shortcut that greatly simplifies decision tasks (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Our rationality is 
bounded by heuristics and cognitive biases as well: heuristics are deviations from prescribed 
procedures while cognitive biases are deviations from correct responses (Polič, 2009). Below 
we present an example for each.  
One of the most frequent cognitive biases is the confirmation bias, which is our 
predisposition to search, interpret and select information that confirms our beliefs, expectations 
and hypothesis (Nickerson, 1998). Simultaneously, we tend to underestimate or even disregard 
information that disproves them. For instance, a reporter who is writing an article with a major 
story may only interview experts that support his/her views on the issue.  
One common heuristic is the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. Every so often, we 
estimate values (such as price, years, weight) from a base value and then adjust our final answer 
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(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). We anchor our answer in that base value, even if unrelated, and 
then adjust it, usually insufficiently. Let us take the example provided by Critcher & Gilovich, 
(2008). In their study, participants saw a photo of a linebacker with a description of his past 
performance. Half of the participants saw a photo with the number “54” on the jersey and the 
other half saw the same photo but with the number “94”, as seen in Figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1.1 The two linebacker photos presented between subjects. Adapted from “Incidental 
environmental anchors,” by C. R. Critcher and T. Gilovich, 2008, Journal of Behavioral 
Decision Making, 21, p. 244. Copyright 2007 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  
 
 Participants were later asked to estimate the linebackers’ performance in the coming 
playoffs. Those who saw him wearing the jersey 94 estimated that his performance would be 
better than did those who saw him wearing jersey 54. Thus, participants anchored on the 
number displayed on the jersey – a completely irrelevant aspect– and failed to adjust the value 
when estimating athletic performance. 
 Why do we use heuristics after all? If this type of intuitive processing leads to severe 
and systematic errors, why do we keep using it? Heuristics not only allow us to simplify 
complex cognitive tasks but also are also quite useful and have surprisingly good results 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). So, the classical explanation is we use an accuracy-effort trade-
off: since the search and processing of information cost time and effort, heuristics tradeoff 
some loss in accuracy for faster and more economical cognition (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 
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2011). However, this is not always true and heuristics are sometimes less costly and more 
efficient than sophisticated statistical methods. The current explanation is we have an 
ecological rationality, that the environment of the decision is crucial in selecting which strategy 
is better and not necessarily “the best one”. Here is where the concept of satisficing becomes 
relevant: the idea is we need not choose the optimal solution, only one that is good-enough, 
one that satisfices (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009).  
 
 In short, our limited rationality stimulated the development of faster and effortless 
strategies – heuristics. Occasionally, these heuristics lead us to mistakes (e.g. anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic) but often allow for a “good-enough solution”, performing better than 
approaches that are more rational. In the following section, we explore how heuristics, 
specifically social heuristics, are associated to cooperative behavior. 
 
Social Heuristics Hypothesis: intuition favors cooperation 
Generally, social heuristics are our intuitive responses in complex and uncertain social 
environments. We often do not have the time or cognitive resources to make a careful and 
deliberate decision and resort instead to these mental shortcuts. So how do these social 
heuristics shape our cooperative behavior? The reflective model of prosociality suggests our 
intuitive response is to be selfish and cooperation requires deliberate thinking. Alternatively, 
the intuitive model defends we are predisposed to cooperate (strengthening Simon’s idea on 
docility), and reflection leads to self-interested choices. 
Empirical evidence supports the intuitive model through three major arguments in favor 
of intuitive prosociality (Zaki & Mitchell, 2013). First, there are behavioral signs of 
automaticity of intuitive behavior: we make prosocial decisions faster than selfish ones; 
reducing ability to exert self-control increases cooperative behavior; and inducing intuitive 
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processing increases cooperation. Second, studies on the neural bases of automaticity indicate 
prosocial choices’ fail to recruit brain regions associated with reflective control but instead 
engage regions associated with reward, suggesting prosociality may reflect a form of reward 
seeking. Third, prosocial behaviors emerge in early development. Young children often exhibit 
prosocial behaviors that are both costly and non-rewarded. For example, toddlers with 18 
months of age already display prosocial behaviors, while controlled behaviors seem to come 
later, between 22 and 48 months of age (Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008). 
 A theoretical model that seems to explain all the empirical evidence gathered so far is 
the Social Heuristic Hypothesis (SHH). This theory considers cooperative decision-making 
within the dual-process framework, proposing a connection between intuition and cooperation. 
This reinforces Simon’s idea of human docility that we are predisposed to cooperate. 
According to the SHH, intuitive cooperation arises from the overgeneralization of social 
heuristics, the automatic and advantageous responses we develop in our daily social 
interactions (Rand et al., 2014). When confronted with atypical situations, more reflective and 
deliberative processes may override these automatic responses, resulting in a more 
advantageous behavior in that context. In other words, intuition is based on these social 
heuristics which we generalize our default response while deliberation, conversely, allows us 
to adjust to the specific social situation we are facing. 
Several studies looked into the effect of processing type – intuitive vs deliberative – on 
human cooperative behavior in economic games1. This line of research uses different methods 
to promote an intuitive processing style, namely by increasing cognitive load, depleting 
cognitive resources, creating time pressure or inducing intuitive decision-making. These 
studies present strong evidence that intuition favors cooperation, as predicted by the SHH (e.g. 
                                                 
1 Economic games are games where subjects make decisions about how to allocate real money/points between 
themselves and others (Rand, 2016). These games are a useful instrument to study human cooperation in the lab, 
as we shall see in the next chapter. 
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Døssing, Piovesan, & Wengström, 2017; Rand et al., 2014; Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012; 
Rand & Nowak, 2013; Roch, Lane, Samuelson, Allison, & Dent, 2000) 
This notion is also supported by studies using a computational approach. It seems that 
depending on the probability of reciprocal consequences (future interaction), evolution favors 
individuals/agents who: 1) always intuitively defect; or 2) who are intuitively predisposed to 
cooperate but when deliberating switch to defection if it is in their self-interest (Bear & Rand, 
2016). This second class of agents, who are successful in diverse environments, provides 
further support for the ideas of human docility and the SHH. 
Rand et al., (2014) tested the SHH inducing intuition or reflection by creating time 
constraints while subjects played economic cooperation games. Time pressure induces subjects 
to rely on intuition and time delay on reflection. These authors examined 15 studies and their 
results confirm the predictions of SHH: that on average time pressure increases cooperation 
comparing to time delay; and that cooperation remains constant under time delay, with 
reflection leading to selfishness. 
Figure 1.2 The effect of time pressure on cooperation in a one shot economic game. Adapted 
from “Social Heuristics Shape Intuitive Cooperation,” by D. G. Rand, A. Peysakhovich, G. T. 
Kraft-Todd, G. E. Newman, O. Wurzbacher, M. A Nowak and J. D. Greene, 2014, Nature 
Communications, 5, p. 6. Copyright by Macmillan Publishers Limited. 
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Authors also observed previous experience with these games moderates the time 
pressure effect. As we can see in Figure 1.2, as subjects (in blue) became more experienced 
with these economic games, less cooperative they became, managing to deliberate even under 
time pressure. Their previous experience probably undermined their cooperative intuitions, 
allowing them to remodel their automatic responses.  
The previous pattern of results emerges in one round (one-shot) economic games, where 
the optimal answer is to always defect, although we many times cooperate in this setting. What 
happens when we play several rounds with the same people? In these repeated games, the 
optimal choice is more difficult to define. Døssing, Piovesan, & Wengström, (2017) used a 
cognitive load manipulation to block deliberative thinking and let subjects play a repeated 
economic game in 4-person groups. Authors observed that higher cognitive load increased the 
cooperation levels in the first rounds but this effect weakened in the following rounds, 
becoming more difficult to interpret. Rand & Nowak, (2013) had two subjects play a repeated 
economic game and looked into subjects’ decision times. They observed that if the partner 
cooperated in the previous round, faster decisions were significantly more cooperative but if 
the partner did not cooperate in the previous round, faster decisions were significantly less 
cooperative. Authors concluded that, in repeated settings, it is intuitive to reciprocate. That is, 
cooperate if others have cooperate and defect if others defected, a strategy termed tit for tat 
(Imhof, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2007).  
A recent meta-analysis investigated the role of intuition and deliberation on cooperation 
using 67 studies (Rand, 2016). These studies manipulated cognitive processing to be more 
intuitive vs deliberative and looked into cooperative behavior in economic games. The SHH 
was theoretical framework guiding this analysis, making predictions on the effect of cognitive 
processing on two forms of cooperation: pure and strategic cooperation. Pure cooperation 
occurs when there is no self-interested motive to cooperate (in one-shot games) whereas in 
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strategic cooperation there are self-interest motives to do so (in repeated games). SHH predicts 
promoting intuition over deliberation should have: no effect on strategic cooperation, since 
both intuition and deliberation favor cooperation; a positive effect on pure cooperation, since 
deliberation favors noncooperation, with some degree of variability based on individual past 
experiences. As predicted by the SHH, promoting intuition over deliberation increased pure 
cooperation by 17.3% but had no overall effect on strategic cooperation. 
 
In sum, we have reasoned that human docility allowed the natural selection of altruists 
and that true altruism exists. A key concept for docility is accepting information without full 
evaluation, which occurs because of our bounded rationality. Given our limited cognition, to 
make sense of a complex and uncertain world we resort to mental shortcuts – heuristics that 
allow for fast decisions without considerable knowledge. In complex social contexts, we use 
social heuristics, which shape our cooperative behavior. According to social heuristics 
hypothesis, supported by vast empirical evidence, we cooperate intuitively (default response), 
using deliberation in more atypical scenarios to adapt to specific situations. 
Now that we understand how human cooperation emerged and which cognitive 
processes underlie it, we can turn our attention towards what shifts our decision from 
cooperation to defection. 
 
Factors influencing human cooperation 
What variables are at play when we decide to cooperate? We can divide the answer in 
two broad categories: dispositional and situational factors. Dispositional variables concern 
personality traits, which are relatively stable individual characteristics, such as one’s social 
values or culture. Situational variables on the other hand, are inconstant and we can further 
classify them into external or internal. External variables relate to the particularities of the 
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environment, such as where the decision takes place, how many people are involved, what are 
the “ground rules”. Internal variables are associated with the individual’s internal state, such 
as current mood and cognitive resources. Here we are interested in glucose levels as an 
indicator of cognitive resources. Since glucose is the main fuel in the brain, our premise is that 
deprivation from the main energetic substrate will reduce our cognitive resources, as we shall 
explore later on. 
  The next chapter focuses on social dilemmas, a powerful tool to study human 
cooperation. There are several social dilemma types but to answer our research question we 
chose to focus on resource dilemmas, also known as commons dilemmas. 
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2. Cooperation in a commons: what happens after the tragedy? 
Before answering this question, we need to understand what constitutes a social 
dilemma and the characteristics of a commons dilemma. Next, we will attempt to operationalize 
cooperation in such dilemmas and describe the variables influencing cooperation in a 
commons. Only after reviewing such evidence and understanding how we behave in commons 
dilemmas, can we reflect about how we behave after a tragedy of the commons (crisis). 
However, not many studies focus on this topic. 
 
What is a social dilemma? 
Roughly, a social dilemma is a situation where there is conflict between an individual’s 
short-term interest and the long-term interest of the collective (e.g. Van Lange, Joireman, 
Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). Actions are expressed in terms of “cooperation” and “defection” 
and each individual always receives a higher payoff for defecting than for cooperating, but all 
are better off by cooperating than if all defect (Dawes & Messick, 2000). In other words, 
individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. 
Some real world phenomena occur precisely because of this conflict between individual 
and collective interests, such as resource depletion, low voter turnout and overpopulation. Let 
us take the example of overfishing to illustrate the social dilemma behind resource depletion. 
Each fishing company wishes to fish as much as possible to increase its profits. However, if all 
fish excessively, fishes will be in danger of extinction. It is sensible to establish a limit for each 
company to fish, in order to preserve this resource. Interestingly, if all choose to cooperate and 
respect this limit, the bigger the temptation to fish above the limit. Again, if everyone does this, 
we are in danger of resource depletion. 
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Social dilemmas in the lab 
Social dilemmas were the focus of different fields such as economics, biology, 
psychology, sociology and political science. The most influential theoretical approach was 
game theory, which is a mathematical formalization of social interaction and strategic behavior 
(Rand & Nowak, 2013) . Game theory lies on the premise that individuals are rational agents 
who are motivated to maximize their gains and minimize their losses. Therefore, it predicts 
individuals will defect in one-shot interactions since this choice maximizes profit and 
minimizes cost. Yet, experimental studies show people deviate from rationality, cooperating 
even in anonymous one-shot situations (Dawes & Thaler, 1988; Rand, 2016; Rand et al., 2014; 
Rand & Nowak, 2013), demonstrating we are not always trying to maximize gains.  
The social dilemma that received more attention in the game theory literature was the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. It describes a game involving two players, each of whom chooses between 
cooperation or defection, where it is individually optimal to defect (regardless of the partner's 
choice) but socially optimal to cooperate (Rand & Nowak, 2013) (see Appendix A for a detailed 
description).  
However, the prisoner’s dilemma games were criticized by their lack of ecological 
validity, since very few social situations have only one interaction partner and only two 
possible actions (cooperate vs defect) with defined outcomes for the self and the other (payoff) 
(Van Lange, Balliet, Parks, & Van Vugt, 2014b). Since our daily decisions of cooperation 
rarely come in binary choice types of cooperating vs competing but, instead, in how much we 
cooperate or compete, researchers developed more complex research paradigms, such as public 
goods dilemmas and resource dilemmas (also known as give-some and take-some dilemmas). 
These belong to the class of N-person dilemmas, which deserve further attention. N-
person games have two characteristics. Let D( m) be the payoff to the defectors in an N-person 
game where m players cooperate, and let C(m) be the payoff to the cooperators when m players 
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(including themselves) cooperate (with m ranging from 0 to N-1). A social dilemma game is 
characterized by two simple inequalities (Dawes, 1980): 
1. D(m) > C(m + 1). An additional cooperator makes less than had he/she remained a defector. 
2. D(O) < C(N). Universal cooperation among the N players leads to a greater payoff to each 
player than does universal defection. 
 
In a public goods dilemma, each individual owns some resource and can give some of 
it to provide an entity or service that all group members may use (Van Lange et al., 2014b). 
Here the resource is usually government provided, such as street lighting, environmental 
protection (air quality, street cleaning), national defense systems, among others.  Public goods 
are both non-excludable and non-rivalrous, that is, everybody has access and one individual’s 
consumption does not reduce the amount available to others. In the case of public goods, we 
face the problem of free-riding. Free-riders are those who benefit from resources, goods, or 
services without contributing by paying the costs that sustain them (Johnson, n.d.) 
In a resource dilemma people have access to a pool of limited size and each individual 
can take some of it from the resource up to a limit (Van Lange et al., 2014b). The resource is a 
common good, such as fisheries, forests, etc. Common goods are non-excludable but rivalrous 
to a certain degree because everybody has access and one individual’s consumption can 
potentially reduce the amount available to others. If everybody takes less than the total pool 
size, each person receives the payoff it requested but if the total of requests exceeds the pool 
size, all receive nothing (Van Lange et al., 2014a). This choice is often repeated and in some 
games, after all participants take some of the resource, the pool is replenished at some rate (e.g. 
20% of the remaining pool size) before the next round begins. 
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Among the class of N-person games, we are particularly interested in the take-some 
game. Let us consider the matrix of the take-some game, which displays the payoff to both 
cooperators and defectors as a function of the number of cooperators, presented in Table 1.1. 
Payoffs refer to the magnitude of the rewards and/or punishments associated with cooperative 
and noncooperative behaviors, respectively (Hine, 1990).  
 
Table 1.1  
Payoffs of the take-some game.  
Adapted from “Social Dilemmas,” by R. M. Dawes, 1980, Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 
p. 180. Copyright 1980 by Annual Reviews Inc. 
 
Observing this table, we can conclude that in addition to the two-abovementioned 
inequalities describing N-person games, the take some game has three additional properties 
(Dawes, 1980). First, the payoff to defectors is bigger as more players cooperate. Second, the 
payoff to cooperators is bigger as more people cooperate. Third, an individual who defects 
receives a higher payoff than if he had cooperated. These proprieties yield the payoff functions 
for cooperating and defecting presented in Figure 1.3. However, the take-some games where 
participants may take points from a pool that can "replenish itself" at varying intervals and in 
amounts that depend upon the subjects' restraint, defy a simple mathematical description like 
the previous. 
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Figure 1.3 Plot of the payoffs for the take-some game. The defection payoff function is above 
the cooperation function for its entire length and the right extremity of the cooperation function 
is higher than the left extremity of the defection function. Adapted from “Social Dilemmas,” 
by R. M. Dawes, 1980, Annual Review of Psychology, 31, p. 181. Copyright 1980 by Annual 
Reviews Inc. 
 
By changing these payoffs we observe cooperation and defection rates change as well. 
Several studies focusing on N-person social dilemmas demonstrated that as we vary the payoffs 
in the direction of greater individual return for cooperating and lower individual return for 
defecting, cooperation levels increase (for reviews see Dawes, 1980; Kollock, 1998). 
 We can increase cooperation by taking the individual profit out of the competitive 
response, similarly to creating taxes for defecting or bonuses cooperating (Kelley & Grzelak, 
1972). By changing the slopes of the payoff functions, we also change the motivational 
pressures for defection: fear (defecting out of fear the other will defect) and greed (defecting 
to get a higher payoff) (Komorita, Sweeney, & Kravitz, 1980). However, an extreme payoff 
can also be a dilemma-nullifier: a considerable increase in the reward for cooperation or in the 
punishment for defection, extinguishes the dilemma (Dawes, 1980; Gifford & Hine, 1997). In 
these scenarios, the incentive to defect essentially disappears. 
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In a recent meta-analysis, rewards and punishments exhibited an equivalent positive 
effect on cooperation (Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011). Additionally, authors observed 
that: 1) higher costs of incentive promoted cooperation; 2) the system administrating the 
incentives (centralized vs decentralized) had no effect on cooperation. Costly incentives 
requires subjects have greater costs to provide reward (for cooperation) and to deliver 
punishments (for noncooperation). The effectiveness of incentives appears to be stronger when 
the incentives were costly to administer, compared to free. It is plausible that the administration 
of costly incentives reflects a strong commitment to promote cooperation, rather than simply 
pursuing self-interest. Centralization of incentives relates to who administers the 
rewards/punishments. Actual participants in the dilemma provide the decentralized incentives 
whereas centralized incentives are those provided by external sources. No differences in 
cooperation were observed as a function of centralization.  
In conclusion, sanctioning systems offer potential benefits to promote cooperation in 
take-some games. On the other hand, they may undermine intrinsic motivations for cooperation 
and interpersonal trust (Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002) 
 
For this project, the dilemma type will be a take-some game, from here forward 
addressed as a commons dilemma. The dilemma here lies in the fact that even though we 
might want to harvest as much as possible for ourselves, if we do so, the resource will deplete 
sooner and no one will be able to harvest more. In other words, collective noncooperation leads 
to a serious threat of depletion of future resources (Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 
1992). Commons dilemmas can be characterized as social traps, since the behavior that leads 
to individual benefit in the short-term can lead to long term collective costs (Platt, 1973). 
Although not specifically defined in even the most influential papers, cooperating is generally 
expressed by harvesting less and defecting by overharvesting. 
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 Edney, (1979) proposed the simplest experimental version of the commons dilemma in 
the laboratory. Subjects sat around a table and were instructed not to communicate. At the 
table’s center was a bowl full of nuts and each subject could take as many nuts from the bowl 
at any time after the start of the trial. At the end of each trial, the number of remaining nuts 
doubled. However, the maximum number of nuts would not exceed a certain number. This 
cycle of collecting and replenishing nuts ends when a given time limit is reached or when the 
players empty the ball. In this version, the bowl represents the resource pool (such as fish in an 
ocean); the nuts the resource itself; the replenishment cycles are the natural regeneration rates; 
and taking the nuts is the harvesting behavior. 
 
Why choosing a commons dilemma to look at cooperation? There were four main 
reasons. First, this N-person game more clearly approximates resource-management problems 
and the dilemma involved in managing a common resource than the traditional prisoner 
dilemma (PD) game (Edney & Harper, 1978b). 
Secondly, a commons dilemma provides us with a quantitative measure of cooperation. 
Here, cooperating is measured by how much we harvest, relatively to the resource available 
and its regeneration rate (Gifford & Hine, 1997). The decision-making is framed in terms of 
how much should I harvest?; instead of should I cooperate or defect?. We consider the former 
approach to be a more ecologically valid measure of cooperation than the qualitative and binary 
choice of the latter. 
Thirdly, we opted by a take-some commons dilemma type due to its decision framing. 
Resource dilemmas can be framed as take-some – how much should I take from the resource? 
- or leave some dilemmas – how much should I leave in the resource?. It was suggested that 
group members are more focused on the outcome distribution when deciding how much to take 
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from the resource than when deciding how much to leave (van Dijk & Wilke, 2000). We opted 
for the take-some version to assure subjects focused on the outcome distribution. 
Finally, the commons also allows for a better operationalization of cooperation. Gifford 
& Hine, (1997) proposed four basic formulas of cooperation: individual restraint, group 
restraint, individual efficiency, and group efficiency. These include four main elements: the 
amount of the resource, the number of harvesters, the size of harvests, and/or the regeneration 
rate of the resource. Their mathematical definition of cooperation allows comparing 
cooperation across studies. Furthermore, these formulas are useful to analyze cooperation 
efficiency, a feature that seems neglected in the literature. 
 
Fate of the commons 
How do we behave when faced with commons dilemmas? Hardin, (1968) proposed in 
his a groundbreaking paper that commons dilemmas will inevitable end in tragedy. To illustrate 
this, he used the example of overpopulation, although it applies to every commons.  
 
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as 
many cattle as possible on the commons. (. . .) As a rational being, each herdsman seeks 
to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What 
is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?”. (Hardin, 1968, pp.1244) 
 
Each herdsman benefits from adding one animal to its heard, increasing his sale profits 
by one animal. Although one more animal creates additional overgrazing, all herdsmen share 
this cost. Thus, the rational herdsman concludes he should add another animal to its herd and 
he keeps adding. Other herdsmen will reach the same conclusion until the pasture is completely 
destroyed, and no herdsman will be able to feed its cattle. Hence, the tragedy of the commons. 
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For Hardin, this tragedy is certain when there is free access to the commons. In his perspective, 
the only solution is mutual coercion mutually agreed upon. In his view, successful management 
of a commons requires an external authority that taxes herdsmen to be able to enforce the 
necessary restrictions to avoid resource extinction.  
However, not all commons end in tragedy, as Gifford & Hine, (1997) demonstrate in 
their paper Towards Cooperation in a Commons. If we accept Simon’s idea of human docility, 
it follows some group members will cooperate given this is a culture-transmitted behavior that 
is adopted without full evaluation. Moreover, several factors other than the mutual coercion 
mutually agreed upon promote or moderate cooperation in a commons and these are addressed 
in the section below. 
 
Defining cooperation in a commons 
In their paper, Gifford & Hine, (1997) emphasize the difficulty in defining cooperation 
in a commons. The most groundbreaking papers do not specifically define cooperation and 
different studies provide dissimilar definitions, such as cooperating as:  
1. Taking none of a resource; 
2. Taking less of a resource than one customarily does or less than some current norm; 
3. Notion of taking a fair share: the amount each harvester should take, relative to the total 
number of harvesters; 
4. Sustainability, efficiency, or conservationism; 
5. Harvesters' own assessment of their harvest practices. 
 
These authors suggest that harvest should not be measured as an absolute number of 
points or resource units taken, but include instead some reference to the size of the resource 
pool and its regeneration rate. However, how can we measure cooperation reliably in a such a 
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complex paradigm? These authors propose some mathematical formulas of cooperation for the 
individual and group level - individual restraint and group restraint – and include measures of 
efficiency – individual and group efficiency.  
However, these measures also have some limitations if their goal is to represent 
cooperation. Suppose an individual takes too much of a resource early on and in the late rounds, 
when the pool is in danger of depletion, he takes very little. Individual restraint and efficiency 
measures may indicate this subject was very cooperative and effective in maintaining the 
resource in the late rounds, when in fact he is only compensating for his initial greed or 
competiveness. 
Another cooperation index used in the literature is the number of rounds participants 
play. The sooner the commons ends, less cooperative were the individuals. Nevertheless, this 
is a gross measure since several groups may finish the resource in the same round with 
completely different harvesting patterns. An alternative and possibly more interesting measure 
is the number of points left at the end of each round or the number of points replenished after 
each round. 
 
What influences cooperation in a commons? 
Several variables influence how much we cooperate in commons dilemmas and we can 
distinguish two categories: individual and situational factors (Kopelman et al., 2002). The 
following section focuses on five individual variables and several situational ones, culminating 
with resource crisis.  
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Individual variables 
Until now, five individual variables were recognized to influence cooperation in a 
commons: previous experience with these dilemmas, culture, gender, expectations about others 
and one’s social value orientation (SVO).  
 
a. Previous dilemma experience 
It appears that substantial previous experience with one-shot anonymous laboratory 
games undermines our intuitive and more automatic response of cooperation (Rand et al., 
2014).  
Cooperative behavior in one-shot PD games is highly dependent on two individual 
characteristics - altruism and reasoning ability – with altruists being more cooperative and high 
reasoning individuals being more competitive (Barreda-Tarrazona, Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, Pavan, 
& Sabater-Grande, 2017). Although altruism and reasoning ability significantly affect behavior 
in single encounters, it appears that previous experience with the repeated PD game takes over 
these two individual characteristics in explaining cooperative behavior. With experience in 
repeated PD games, all players (high and low altruism vs high and low reasoning ability) 
reached similar levels of sustained cooperation in the repeated game. 
Not surprisingly, previous experience with commons dilemmas improves resource 
management (Gifford & Hine, 1997; Hine, 1990).  The effect of prior experience in commons 
dilemmas was studied by manipulating group size and type of experience – either group or 
individual experience2 (Allison & Messick, 1985). Results indicate previous individual 
experience improved subsequent group performance more than previous group experience. 
Overall, groups with individual experienced members kept the resource active much longer 
                                                 
2 Subjects either managed the resource alone (individual experience) or managed the resource with a group 
(group experience). 
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and harvested less than group experienced or no experience members. Large groups seemed to 
benefit more from previous experience (particularly individual) than smaller groups. 
In general, it seems that experience with a particular game type leads to better 
performance on that game, which means defecting in one-shot interactions and, generally, 
cooperating in repeated games. In one-shot games, regardless of what the adversary choses, the 
best strategy is to defect. If one player is selfless, the most profitable action for the other one 
is to exploit the good faith being selfish. On the other hand, if one player is selfish, the best 
action for the opponent is to be selfish too, minimizing the damage. Interestingly, this does not 
happen in the real world and we often cooperate in one-shot games (e.g. Rand, 2016; Rand et 
al., 2014; Rand & Nowak, 2013). In iterated/repeated games, the “best strategy” is more 
difficult to define. Currently, the best strategy in PD games Pavlov, also known as, win-stay, 
loose-shift (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993). It starts with a cooperative move and then, the player 
repeats the last action if it was profitable, otherwise it changes actions. In commons dilemma 
there is no concise definition of an optimal strategy since the behavior of other group members 
is a quantitative rather than qualitative choice.  
 
b. Culture 
A few studies on the influence of culture on cooperative behavior in social dilemmas 
have been conducted, comparing individual and collective cultures. In general, collective 
cultures are more cooperative in N-person games but more punishing when there is the 
possibility of administering sanctions. 
Liebrand & van Run, (1985) compared cooperative behavior of American and Dutch 
subjects in a commons dilemma. Although Americans were expected to display relatively more 
competitive social motives and Dutch subjects relatively more cooperative ones, no differences 
in social motives or cooperative behavior were observed. 
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However, a subsequent study compared the behavior in a commons dilemma of 
American (individualistic culture) with the Vietnamese (extremely collectivist culture) (Parks 
& Vu, 1994). Americans cooperated at typical levels in most social dilemma studies while the 
Vietnamese cooperated at an exceptionally high rate, even when playing against an extremely 
competitive algorithm. 
A known way to induce cooperation in social dilemmas is through rewarding 
cooperators and punishing of non-cooperators (see Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011 for a 
meta-analysis). These authors analyzed data from 27 countries in their meta-analysis, revealing 
that the impact of incentives on cooperation varies significantly between countries. Punishment 
had a positive effect on cooperation in several countries (e.g., Australia, Japan, United States) 
and enhanced group efficiency but tended to have no impact on cooperation in Russian 
samples, for example, reducing group profits.  
Another culture dependent behavior is antisocial punishment, which consists in 
punishing cooperators (Herrmann, Thöni, & Gächter, 2008). For example, non-cooperators 
who were punished in the past for their behavior might retaliate against cooperators, since they 
are the most likely to have punish them. These authors compared several cultures around the 
world in public good experiments with and without punishment. They found evidence of 
stronger antisocial punishment in collectivist societies than individualistic ones, possibly 
because the former are more inclined to perceive other participants as outgroup3 members. 
Further analysis of these results revealed that in the absence of punishment, individual variation 
is much more important than cultural variation in explaining cooperation, with the opposite 
being true in the presence of punishment (Gächter, Herrmann, & Thöni, 2010).  
                                                 
3 Generally, an outgroup is a group which an individual does not identify with (different race, gender, age, religion, 
etc.). but can also be elicited based on trivial criteria such as aesthetic preference or random assignment (Tajfel, 
1974). 
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c. Gender 
A recent meta-analytic review verified there are no significant sex differences in 
cooperation in social dilemmas (Balliet, Li, Macfarlan, & Van Vugt, 2011). However, the 
association between sex and cooperation is moderated by the social context. The analysis 
revealed that men cooperate more than women in same-sex interactions but women are the 
more cooperative gender in mix-sex interactions. Additionally, as the dilemma continues for 
several rounds, men become increasingly more cooperative than women. Finally, sex 
differences in cooperation are unaffected by group size and the type of dilemma (prisoner’s 
dilemma, public goods or commons dilemma). 
 
d. Social Value Orientation 
Social motives or one’s social value orientation (SVO) is currently regarded as a stable 
personality trait which reflects how people evaluate outcomes for self and others, determining 
cooperative motives, strategies, and choice behavior (Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 2008). 
 McClintock, (1972) identified four social orientation types: 1) competition – the 
motivation is to maximize relative gains, the difference between one’s outcome and that of the 
other; 2) individualism, where the motivation is to maximize one’s own gains; 3) cooperation 
– the motivation is to maximize joint gain; 4) and altruism, where the motivation is to maximize 
the other parties’ gains. Therefore, according to this classification we should consider SVO as 
a spectrum from competition to altruism, as presented in Figure 1.4. 
Figure 1.4 Social Value Orientation Spectrum. 
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Social value orientation seems to have a weak but reliable relationship with gender: the 
percentage of prosocials (cooperators) is slightly higher among women than men, while that of 
proselves (individualists and competitors) is higher among men (Kopelman et al., 2002). 
Literature suggests people with different social values select different behavioral 
strategies in social dilemmas (Bogaert et al., 2008). Prosocials are expected to be more sensitive 
to trustworthiness, which increases their expectation of reciprocated cooperation and reduces 
the fear of being exploited. Proselves, on the other hand, need explicit incentives to align the 
goal of pursuing their own best interest with the goal of cooperating with the collective.  
 
 More than 82 studies have been conducted to assess the relationship between SVO and 
cooperation in social dilemmas  (Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009) but we will solely focus on 
the ones addressing SVO in iterated commons dilemmas. Not surprisingly, prosocials are more 
cooperative than proselves, with the latter harvesting significantly more resources than the 
former (e.g. Balliet et al., 2009; Budescu, Au, & Chen, 1997; Joireman, Posey, Truelove, & 
Parks, 2009; Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986; Liebrand, 1984; Liebrand & van Run, 
1985; Loomis, Samuelson, & Sell, 1995; Parks, 1994; Roch & Samuelson, 1997). 
Liebrand, (1984), observed consistent differences between the four classes of social 
motivation in the amount of resources taken for self. Competitive subjects harvested the most, 
individualists harvested a little less but still above average. Cooperative and altruistic subjects 
took the smallest amounts.  
 In a subsequent study, this relationship between SVO and cooperation in a commons 
was analyzed in two different cultures: American (more competitive) and Dutch (more 
cooperative) (Liebrand & van Run, 1985). Americans were expected to have a greater 
percentage of proself individuals but no differences in the distribution of social motives neither 
in the amount of resources taken to self were observed when comparing both cultures. 
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However, in both groups competitive subjects harvested the most, next came individualistic 
subjects, cooperative subjects took even less and altruistic subjects took the least. Finally, 
Budescu et al., (1997), again observed that the points requested were systematically related to 
the players’ social values. Competitive subjects harvested the most (mean points harvested = 
145.4), followed by individualistic (100.3) and then cooperative subjects (96.2), and with 
altruists harvesting the least (87.4).  
This decreasing pattern in harvest behavior when we move towards the prosocial end 
of the SVO spectrum supports the notion of social motives as a continuum. However, in most 
studies the only reported differences of social motives in cooperative behavior are between 
prosocials and proselves (e.g. de Kwaadsteniet, van Dijk, Wit, & de Cremer, 2006; Kramer, 
McClintock, & Messick, 1986; Roch & Samuelson, 1997). More studies on the relationship of 
SVO and cooperation in commons dilemmas were not included above because SVO was not 
the variable of interest. Nevertheless, those findings are mentioned throughout this section and, 
as we shall see, the behavior of prosocials and proselves differs under several conditions. 
To summarize, prosocials and proselves differ in three dimensions in commons 
dilemmas: cooperative behavior, rationality and intelligence perception (Kopelman et al., 
2002). As presented above, prosocials are more likely to cooperate in commons dilemmas. 
Prosocials tend to view rationality in collective terms whereas proselves tend to view it in 
individual terms. Moreover, prosocials tend to see cooperation as moral and of competition as 
immoral, while proselves tend to consider competition as more effective. Finally, both 
prosocials and proselves believe their own strategy to be the more intelligent.  
 
e. Expectations about others 
Expectations about the behavior of other group members may be determinant in each 
individual’s decision to cooperate or defect (Williams, Jackson, & Karau, 1995). One’s choices 
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in such dilemmas not only reflect beliefs about others, but also affect these beliefs (Dawes, 
McTavish, and Shaklee, 1977). That is, expectations about others influence the subjects’ 
decision to cooperate or defect and vice versa. 
Interestingly, different expectations about others can lead to defection, which further 
obscures the interpretation of behavior in social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980). A subject can defect 
because he/she believes others will not defect, aiming to receive a big payoff; or he/she can 
defect on the belief others will defect, in order to avoid a big loss. In the former, the motive 
behind defecting is greed and in the latter, the reason is fear. 
Some studies use the concept of trust to infer expectations of others’ behaviors and 
typically observe a strong positive relationship between trust and cooperative behavior 
(Williams, Jackson, & Karau, 1995). That is, trusting others will cooperate increases the 
likelihood that the subject cooperates himself. 
More interestingly, several studies suggest that one’s own social value orientation 
influences expectations about others (Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Kelley & Stahelski, 
1970; Kramer et al., 1986; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976; Liebrand, 1984; Maki & McClintock, 
1983) 
Kelley & Stahelski, (1970) propose that proselves expect others to be homogeneously 
competitive, while prosocials have no consistent expectation. This happens because proselves 
elicit competition from both prosocials and proselves. Since prosocials resort to competition 
with proselves and use cooperation with other prosocials, they are more heterogeneous in their 
expectations. This differential pattern in expectations according to one’s own SVO is called 
the triangle hypothesis. 
Kuhlman & Wimberly, (1976), proposed an alternative justification for the observed 
differences in expectations, although both explanations are not mutually exclusive. Their 
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observations suggest that subjects’ expectations about others are a function of their own 
motivation, with subjects expecting others to be in their "motivational neighborhood”. 
Since the above studies used the prisoner’s dilemma game, we should also explore the 
role of SVO on expectations in commons dilemma. As anticipated, prosocials expect more 
cooperation from others than do proselves (Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986) and 
proselves expect more defection, predicting approximately four times as much defection than 
prosocials (Dawes et al., 1977). In accordance to the “motivational neighborhood” explanation, 
Kramer et al., (1986) propose that individuals use their own social values as base-rate 
information when making prediction about others’ values and behaviors. They also suggest this 
phenomenon might be a reflection of the egocentric attribution bias – information about the 
self is more readily available and easier to retrieve (Ross & Sicoly, 1979) 
 Contrarily to this egocentric attribution bias, Liebrand, (1984) observed that 
competitive subjects expected others to take fewer resources than they intended to themselves; 
and altruistic subjects expected others to take more resources than they intended to themselves. 
In two experiments, authors found both the egocentric attribution hypothesis and the triangle 
hypothesis were too restrictive to explain the pattern of results. However, these results should 
be considered separately, since expectations about others were evaluated after feedback of how 
others behaved.  
 Subjects with different social motives not only differ in their expectations of others’ 
behavior but also vary in their predictive accuracy (Maki & McClintock, 1983). In this study, 
subjects observed “choosers” (preprogrammed players with an altruistic, cooperative, 
individualistic, or competitive SVO) select between self and other outcome alternatives. 
Results confirmed that subjects' own SVO affected their abilities to predict the different 
choosers' behaviors. Cooperative and individualistic subjects displayed increased predictive 
accuracy, regardless of the choosers’ SVO, while altruistic and competitive subjects varied 
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their predictive accuracy as a function of the choosers’ orientation. Cooperative subjects proved 
to be the most accurate predictors on average (82%), followed by individualistic (72%), 
altruistic (65%), and finally competitive subjects (64%). Authors suggest that altruists and 
competitors may be less attentive and less motivated to think about the others’ behavior 
because it has little to no implication for their strategy. Regardless of playing with an altruist, 
cooperator, individualist or competitor, altruists respond with cooperation (maximizing the 
others’ gain) and competitors with competition. The prior pattern of findings does not support 
the egocentric attribution hypothesis since subjects did not systematically predict the choosers’ 
behavior would be consistent with their own SVO. Instead, the pattern of results for cooperative 
and competitive subjects resembled the triangle effect observed by Kelley & Stahelski, (1970). 
 
 
Situational variables 
The situational variables influencing cooperation in a commons dilemma are related to 
the task structure and to the subjects’ perception. Concerning the former, we can further divide 
it into two categories: social and decision structure. Social structure includes the power and 
status of group members, ability to communicate between themselves and group size as well. 
Decision structure relates to the resource status (environmental uncertainty, territoriality and 
resource use). As to the perceptual factors modulating cooperation, we have the way the 
problem is framed; the causes of what is happening with the resource; providing information 
about strategies; and degree of identification with other group members. 
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Perception 
a. Frames 
Framing, in the study of decision-making, concerns the ways in which outcomes, options, 
and actions are described (Kopelman et al., 2002). The manner the social dilemma is framed 
clearly influences cooperation. 
First, framing the outcomes of the dilemma as gains or losses. When people contribute 
or give money, they experience a loss (public-goods dilemma); and when they harvest from a 
resource they experience a gain (commons dilemma). Subjects with a cooperative SVO, 
cooperate more in loss-framed games than in gain-framed ones, while the reverse tends to be 
true for individualists and competitors (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997). 
Second, framing games as entrepreneurial or social exchange. This was studied by 
introducing subjects with a cooperative vs entrepreneurial reading material followed by a 
public goods game. As predicted, people made more cooperative choices when the task was 
framed as a social exchange study than as a business transaction study (Elliott, Hayward, & 
Canon, 1998). 
Finally, framing the decision problem in terms of taking (commons dilemma) or giving 
(public goods). When the decision problem is framed as taking vs giving, we observe 
differences in choice behavior (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Fleishman, 1988) or in the willingness  
to appoint a leader (Rutte, Wilke, & Messick, 1987).  
In commons and public goods dilemmas participants are either focused on what they 
end up with (take or keep) or on what they contribute (give or leave) (van Dijk & Wilke, 2000). 
These authors suggest group members are less focused on the consequences of their actions for 
the final outcome distribution when deciding how much to contribute (give or leave) than when 
deciding how much they will end up with (take or keep). Subjects are more motivated to 
minimize differences in final outcomes in commons dilemmas because distributing outcomes 
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equally among members is more salient; and in public goods dilemmas, providing enough to 
provide the public good is more salient (van Dijk & Wilke, 1995). This is consistent with the 
phrasing effect, first described by Harris & Joyce, (1980), who observed subjects were more 
concerned with distributing outcomes equally if they were focused on outcomes instead of 
expenses. 
 
b. Causes 
People will only try to solve social dilemmas if they believe it is their responsibility and 
if they place causal agency on themselves (Kopelman et al., 2002). Additionally, how people 
perceive which is causing the situation will influence how much of a resource they harvest. 
This relates to the causes of the priority position regarding access to a shared resource, 
scarcity/abundance of the resource and preferences for appointing a leader. 
 Regarding the priority position in the access to a shared resource, there is a known 
“position effect”, where the first ones to harvest have a distinct advantage, making larger 
requests than the players who come later (e.g. Budescu, Au, & Chen, 1997; Budescu, Rapoport, 
& Suleiman, 1995; Budescu, Suleiman, & Rapoport, 1995; Suleiman, Budescu, & Rapoport, 
1994). When there is a reasonable explanation for the privileged position  – participants 
somehow “earned the right” to be the first – we observe they take more from the resource than 
participants whose privilege position is perceived as more unfair or random (Samuelson & 
Allison, 1994).  
The cause of scarcity or abundance of the resource pool can be attributed either to other 
group members or to nature. In a water shortage scenario in California, people who respected 
the limits of water usage believed the shortage had natural causes whereas those who exceeded 
their limit believed the shortage was people-induced (Talarowski, 1982). Additionally, when 
there is full knowledge about pool size, the shortage or abundance is attributed to other people 
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but is attributed to chance or nature when the pool size is invisible (Rutte, Wilke, & Messick, 
1987). 
Lastly, the perceived cause of a resource crisis (resource depletion) influences the 
preference for a structural solution – designating a leader. When this prior failure was attributed 
to task difficulty, 57% of the subjects favored appointing a leader; and when the failure was 
attributed to personal greed, only 30% chose having a leader (Samuelson, 1991). 
 
c. Social identity 
Relatively minor changes in the social environment can induce major changes in 
decision making, such as the decision maker seeing himself/herself as an individual or as a part 
of a group (Dawes & Messick, 2000). This social identity can either be elicited by naturally 
occurring groups, such as individuals from the same country, religion, etc., or through a social 
identity manipulation.  
Baird, (1982) observed that subjects who shared a monetary reward before doing a 
commons dilemma task (collective identity) were able to preserve the resource more effectively 
and earned more money than groups that had not shared a reward earlier (individual identity).  
Later, Kramer & Brewer, (1984) observed that a collective social identity promoted 
cooperation in an endangered commons, even when the basis of this group identity is minimal 
(Tajfel, 1970, 1974). Social identity was either manipulated by varying the “common fate”4 of 
group members (collective vs individual); or naturally occurring social categories were used 
(age and student status). When faced with an endangered commons, individuals were more 
likely to exhibit self-restraint when the collective identity was salient. In the individual 
condition, mean harvest per trial was always above optimum level to sustain the resource. 
                                                 
4 in the collective condition, subjects were told there would be one lottery to determine the monetary value of 
points for all players; and in the individual condition that there was one lottery for each player. 
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Contrarily, when collective identity was salient, the mean harvest per trial reached optimum 
level (and even suboptimal) in the depletion conditions. 
Using the same “common fate” manipulation (collective vs individual conditions), 
Brewer & Kramer, (1986) replicated the previous finding and further demonstrated the power 
of social identity. The social identity manipulation only had an effect when there was already 
a severe depletion of the common resource. Self-restraint was higher in the collective identity 
than in the individual identity group, especially when the group size was large. Notably, this 
occurred despite expectations of reciprocity and overall low perception of self-efficacy in the 
large group collective condition. 
Simpson, (2006) reviews two explanations regarding the effects of social identity on 
cooperation and proposes social identity leads group members to maximize group outcomes 
and minimize group inequalities, reducing the motivational greed to receive a big payoff while 
the fear of being exploited remains unaffected. 
 
d. Informing about strategies 
Not surprisingly, studies on the relation between providing information about strategies 
and resource management efficiency yielded positive results (Hine, 1990).  
 Stern, (1976) manipulated the type of educational strategy given to participants: some 
information vs full information. The former informed about long-range consequences and the 
latter presented detailed information about the long-term effects of consumption. While “some 
information” had no effect, “full information” increased conservation and extended the lifetime 
of available resources. 
 Rapoport, (1988) replicated these results, comparing minimal and full instructions, the 
latter including the disclosure of the collective rational strategy. Full instructions had a small 
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positive effect, raising the level of cooperation at several indices but very few groups actually 
adopted the collective rational strategy. 
Surprisingly, giving some information about the decision problem may be more 
effective than providing a “good strategy” (Edney & Harper, 1978b). In this experiment there 
were three levels of information: no information (basic game instructions); information about 
social trap characteristics; and effective strategy. Unexpectedly, groups provided with an 
effective strategy performed as poorly as subjects given no information did. However, groups 
given information about the social trap performed significantly better than the previous two, 
having significantly more points, rounds played and pool replenishments. One explanation is 
that even after learning about the benefits of cooperation, defection remains the dominant 
strategy for each individual (Hine, 1990). 
While Edney & Harper, (1978) informed subjects on a good strategy, Schroeder, 
Jensen, Reed, Sullivan, & Schwab, (1983) actually informed them about the optimal strategy. 
When they did not inform subjects about the optimal strategy, participants observed and 
sometimes adopted the behavior of other group members and this social conformity led to 
suboptimal results. However, when a credible source provided the optimal strategy, subjects 
reduced their tendency to guide their behavior by the actions of others.  
 
e. Moral suasion 
Limited processing theory suggests that eliciting feelings of altruism, morality, and 
responsibility among group members should help to preserve the commons by drawing their 
attention away from the payoff structure (Hine, 1990) 
 Before beginning a commons dilemma task, all subjects were instructed the goal was 
to get as many points as possible (control group) and half read an additional moral message 
(moral suasion group) suggesting that individuals “do unto others as you would have them do 
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unto you” (Edney & Bell, 1983 cited in Martichuski & Bell, 1991). Authors observed the 
management of the commons of the moral suasion group improved in comparison to the control 
group. Using the same “golden rule” manipulation, Martichuski & Bell, (1990) replicated these 
findings. Subjects in the moral suasion group increased the overall harvest and the life of the 
commons in comparison to controls. 
Not only can we promote cooperation through a prior “moral message”, but we can also 
encourage competition by altering the content of this message (Sattler & Kerr, 1991). In this 
study, subjects heard one of three audiotaped messages before performing a commons dilemma 
task: 1) moral message – encouraged cooperation by indicating it is a good, moral, and socially 
approved behavior; 2) power message – induced defection by indicating that it can lead to 
power, control, and domination of the game; 3) control message. In comparison with subjects 
in the control condition, subjects hearing the moral message were significantly less 
competitive, and subjects hearing the power message were significantly more competitive. 
 
Task structure 
a. Social structure 
i. Power, status and leadership 
The power and status of individuals in a commons dilemma can have a significant effect 
on how individuals and their actions are perceived (Kopelman et al., 2002). In a commons, 
power can be defined as a privileged position in terms of access or management of a common 
resource. Examples are some people having access to the resource first; some being able to 
take more items from the resource than others; deciding how to distribute the resources among 
group members, attributing rewards and penalties to other group members, etc. 
When an individual betrays expectations in a commons dilemma, the justification he 
offers for that behavior is perceived differently, according to his/her level of power and status 
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(Massey, Freeman, & Zelditch, 1997). Authors manipulated the power and status (higher or 
equal) of a preprogrammed group member and the justifications he gave for his behavior (valid, 
ambiguous or invalid). In general, authors observed that when individuals had a higher status 
(e.g. Ph.D. in resource management) and/or higher power (could administrate rewards and 
penalties at the end of each round) a valid or ambiguous justification for the offending acts was 
perceived as more acceptable by other group members. However, if the justification was 
invalid, the higher status became a liability. 
When there are such power imbalances, the dilemma is said to be asymmetric and, in 
these cases, there is a stronger tendency towards overharvesting (Mannix, 1993; Wade-
Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996). For example, Mannix, (1993) observed that groups 
with power imbalances made less efficient use of the resources; were more likely to distribute 
resources to a subset of the group; and took more effort to reach agreements on resource 
distributions. However, some forms of communication, such as discussion or voting, between 
group members can counteract this effect (Kopelman et al., 2002).  
 
 Interestingly, the effects of asymmetry are dependent on the dilemma type (van Dijk & 
Wilke, 1995). In public goods games, subjects tend to guide their behavior by the 
proportionality rule: they consider it fair if group members contribute in proportion to their 
endowments (van Dijk & Grodzka, 1992) or interest position (van Dijk & Wilke, 1993). For 
example, members with twice as much endowments should contribute twice as much and 
members having twice as much interest in the public good should contribute twice as much. 
On the other hand, in commons dilemmas we observe subjects have a tendency to base their 
decisions on the equal final outcomes rule (Samuelson & Messick, 1986). These authors 
compared high access vs low access members, where the former could take three times more 
resource units per trial than latter. High access members took only slightly more than low 
  
45 
 
access members, suggesting that subjects may have based their decisions on the equal outcomes 
rule. 
Wit & Wilke, (1990) examined the role of who presented rewards and punishments in 
a social dilemma (government vs parent company), and to whom they were presented 
(undergraduates vs managers). For undergraduates, considered “lay people”, there was no 
difference between the effectiveness of rewards or punishments on their choices, regardless of 
which entity presented them. In contrast, for managers, who are more knowledgeable, rewards 
provided by the parent company were highly effective, while those supplied by the government 
were counterproductive. 
Under certain conditions, group members willingly endow authorities with additional 
control over the resource or opt to appoint a leader. Namely when they have failed to manage 
a resource efficiently (Messick et al., 1983; Samuelson, 1991) and when inequalities in 
harvesting outcomes emerge (Rutte & Wilke, 1984; Samuelson & Messick, 1986). Not 
surprisingly, group members will endorse leaders when they are successful in maintaining the 
common resource (Wit, Wilke, & Van Dijk, 1989; Wit & Wilke, 1988). 
Samuelson & Messick, (1986) created a power imbalance by varying access to a 
resource pool (high vs low), with high access members being able to take triple as much. They 
also manipulated the level of variance in others' harvests (low and high); and level of resource 
use (optimal and overuse). As expected, high access members harvested more than low access 
subjects. After, subjects voted on the possibility of a structural change in second session. Only 
high access subjects voted more strongly for electing a group leader or dividing the commons 
in equal territories, when they experienced resource overuse in the first session, with high 
variance in others’ harvests, 
Rutte & Wilke, (1984) replicated this effect, with more subjects in the overuse 
(compared to optimal and underuse) and in high variance (compared to low variance condition) 
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voting to appoint a leader. Additionally, when subjects acted as leaders they reduced their 
harvests and allocated outcomes equitably to group members. This goes in line with Messick 
et al., (1983) findings, where leaders in a second session of the commons harvested much less 
than as common group members in a first session, and did so very close to the optimum level.  
 
 
ii. Communication 
A meta-analytic review reported a large positive effect of communication on 
cooperation in social dilemmas (Balliet, 2010). This effect was moderated by two variables: 
type of communication, with a stronger effect of face-to-face discussion compared to written 
messages; and group size, with a stronger effect in larger groups. No differences were observed 
for communication that occurred before or during iterated dilemmas. Most of the dilemmas 
comprised in this meta-analysis were give-some or PD games, with only three studies using a 
commons dilemma. 
Dawes et al., (1977) used a one shot version of a commons dilemma with four 
communication conditions: no communication, irrelevant communication, relevant 
communication, and relevant communication plus roll call (nonbinding declaration of intended 
decision). Results demonstrate that defection was significantly higher in the no-communication 
and irrelevant-communication conditions than in relevant-communication and relevant-
communication plus roll call conditions. 
Through a content analysis of group discussion, Brechner, (1977) observed that subjects 
talked more frequently about one’s own progress in the game and asked about others’ progress 
(in terms of total points obtained). The second most frequent type of statements were requests 
to stop harvesting when pool neared depletion; and, in third place came strategy suggestions. 
He also replicated the beneficial effect of communication on cooperation in a commons. 
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 Finally, communication seems to have the same positive effect on cooperation, 
regardless of subjects’ social value orientation (Liebrand, 1984). As expected, when 
communication was allowed, significantly fewer sources were taken for self and, perhaps 
surprisingly, this effect did not differ across individuals with different social motives. 
Why does communication promote cooperation? It was suggested that group discussion 
increases cooperation possibly because: 1) it enhances group identity or solidarity; 2) it elicits 
commitments to cooperate (Kopelman et al., 2002). Two studies manipulating the 
presence/absence of communication demonstrate group identity alone is insufficient to account 
for the communication effect and suggest the explanation lies in the commitment to cooperate 
(Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994) or in the perceived consensus to cooperate (Bouas & 
Komorita, 1996). Another possibility is that discussion decreases egocentric biases (Wade-
Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996). 
 
iii. Group size 
Several empirical studies using the N-person PD, support that cooperation is an inverse 
function of group size (Dawes, 1980; Komorita et al., 1980; Marwell & Schmitt, 1972). In 
other N-person games, group size has a different impact on cooperation according to the 
framing of the dilemma (Brewer & Kramer, 1986). Social dilemmas framed as public goods 
(giving) seem to be more sensitive to group size effects than those framed as commons 
dilemmas (taking) 
 When comparing different sized groups we observe differences in cooperation and in 
the impact of what happened in the previous trial (Hamburger, Guyer, & Fox, 1975). In a take-
some task comparing three and seven person groups, the smaller-sized group was markedly 
more cooperative than the larger group. Moreover, in small groups, the probability of an 
individual cooperating in a given trial is little affected by the number of players that cooperated 
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in the previous trial. In larger groups, however, authors observed this probability of cooperation 
in a given trial actually decreases as more people cooperated in the previous trials. This finding 
suggests that members of the larger group experience deindividuation, first described by 
Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, (1952). That is, the effect of a crowd or group on an 
individual’s behavior that often results in a loss of self-identity, which can encourage 
aggression or deviations from social acceptable behaviors (Diener, 1989). 
In sum, small groups tend to be more cooperative than larger groups. Possible causes 
are larger groups are more likely to contain noncooperative persons (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970); 
the communication of intentions and influence through behavior becomes less effective with 
increasing group size (Bonacich, Shure, Kahan, & Meeker, 1976); and the is a lower sense of 
perceived individual and collective self-efficacy in larger groups (Kerr, 1989). Additionally, 
larger groups are associated with deindividuation, social loafing5, diffusion of responsibility, 
“big pool illusion” and smaller payoffs for cooperating (Hine, 1990). For this latter reason, the 
relation between cooperation and group size may be positive or negative depending on how 
individual and group payoffs are affected by variations in group size (Bonacich et al., 1976).  
 
iv. Choices public vs private 
Literature on the effect of anonymity in social dilemmas has yielded inconsistent 
results, with some studies finding a positive effect (Dawes, 1980) and others a negative or even 
no effect at all (Williams et al., 1995).  
Only one commons dilemma study directly addressed this issue (Jorgenson & Papciak, 
1981). Identifiability was manipulated by the use of the name tags and feedback about the 
choices of each player. Additionally, authors also manipulated the possibility of 
communication and resource feedback. They observed that groups in the high identifiability 
                                                 
5 tendency for individuals to expend less effort when working collectively than when working individually (Karau 
& Williams, 1993). 
  
49 
 
condition harvested more money and maintained the commons longer only when they were not 
allowed to communicate and no resource feedback was given. This reinforces the general idea 
that identifiability increases cooperation, adding it only occurs under certain conditions. 
 Williams et al., (1995) suggested that the role of identifiability on cooperation may 
depend on ambiguity of social desirable behaviors, salience of different behavioral goals or 
differences in the operationalization of identifiability. 
 
b. Decision structure 
i. Environmental uncertainty 
Uncertainty tends to reduce cooperation in commons dilemmas, although not always 
(Kopelman et al., 2002). There are three levels of environmental uncertainty: resource 
visibility, pool regeneration rate and number of trials. 
Complete invisibility of resources leads to early destruction of the pool through 
overharvesting (Cass & Edney, 1978). Pool size uncertainty is associated with significant 
increases in individual requests and decreases group efficiency (Budescu, Suleiman, et al., 
1995; Gustafsson, Biel, & Gärling, 1999; Hine & Gifford, 1996). As uncertainty about the pool 
size increases, subjects tend to overestimate the pool size (Budescu, Rapoport, & Suleiman, 
1990). This “overestimation” may be a justification for their overharvesting behavior 
(Kopelman et al., 2002). Like the diffusion of social responsibility in large groups (e.g. Latané 
& Darley, 1968), uncertainty also may act to diffuse personal accountability. Interestingly, 
subjects’ SVO influences harvest behavior under conditions of high but not low uncertainty, 
with prosocials reducing their harvests but not proselves (de Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006; Roch 
& Samuelson, 1997). 
Uncertainty regarding the regeneration rate of the pool also produces significant 
declines in individual restraint and group efficiency (Hine & Gifford, 1996). Finally, 
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uncertainty about the number of trials can actually have the opposite effect.  A consistent 
finding in the gaming literature is that cooperation drops off as the end of the interaction draws 
near (Kopelman et al., 2002). This is called the “end-game effect”: in finite games, cooperation 
often starts high and declines as the number of rounds increases, reaching its minimum towards 
the end of the game  (Bar-El & Tobol, 2013). 
 
ii. Territorialization 
The analysis of five studies on the privatization of the commons – dividing the resource 
into individually managed territories – demonstrated it improves resource management 
efficiency (Hine, 1990). However, territorial division is considered a dilemma nullifier, that is, 
it erases the dilemma because only one harvester takes resources from each sub-territory 
(Gifford & Hine, 1997). Here, cooperation with others no longer exists and we are only 
evaluating if subjects comprehend that one must harvest approximately at the resource 
regeneration rate. 
Cass & Edney, (1978) manipulated territorial division and resource visibility. Dividing 
the commons in individual territories significantly improved resource management, increasing 
the supply (points left), production (points replenished), and the harvest. A combination of 
visibility of resources and territorial division resulted in near optimum harvesting. However, 
territories without resource visibility actually produced a non-optimal overcaution in 
harvesting. Post-experimental questionnaires revealed that in this system of territories, subjects 
felt more in control and more personally responsible. 
Martichuski & Bell, (1991) observed that privatization of the resource pool was the 
most effective in maximizing total harvest, extending the life of the commons and protecting 
the commons from ruin. Interestingly, when the resource was divided into private territories, 
neither rewards nor punishments helped the management of the commons. 
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iii. Resource overuse and crisis 
Another variable that influences cooperation is whether the resource is being overused, 
that is, if the subjects’ harvests are too high and the resource is rapidly diminishing (Messick 
et al., 1983). 
When resources are used efficiently there is little pressure upon individuals to modify 
their behavior (Kramer et al., 1986). However, when faced with a resource crisis, subjects have 
conflicting pressures regarding their harvest behavior. On the one hand, they can increase their 
harvests because they conform to the overharvesting behavior of other subjects or because of 
their urge to get all they can before the resource disappears – “getting while the getting is still 
good” (Kramer et al., 1986; Messick et al., 1983). On the other hand, they can decrease their 
harvests to compensate the resource overuse, due to their desire to maintain the pool. Studies 
presented below demonstrate that: trust in others, culture, social value orientation and 
information moderate harvest behavior under conditions of resource overuse. 
 Messick et al., (1983) manipulated subjects’ perception of the resource use: underuse, 
optimal use or overuse; and homogeneity of harvesting behavior: low variance (others took 
relatively similar harvests) or high variance (others' harvests differed greatly). They also 
included a measure of trust in others by asking subjects how much they expected other 
members to reciprocate restraint in harvesting. Authors observed that in the resource underuse 
and optimal use conditions, regardless of the level of prior trust, harvest behavior tended to 
increase over time. In the resource overuse condition, trust moderated subjects’ behavior. “Low 
trust” subjects (who did not expect others to reciprocate restraint) tended to increase the size 
of their harvests over time. Conversely, “high trust” subjects reduced their harvests as if to 
preserve the pool, despite knowing others were not restricting their harvests.  
 Brann & Foddy, (1987) replicated this moderating effect of trust under resource overuse 
in a subsequent study. The consumption rate of “low trusters” was unaffected by the rate at 
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which the resource deteriorated. “High trusters” consumed more than “low trusters” when 
resource deterioration was minimal, but significantly less than “low trusters” under conditions 
of rapid deterioration.  
 Samuelson, Messick, Rutte, & Wilke, (1984) replicated some of these findings using a 
similar design to Messick et al., (1983). Additionally, they looked into the impact of culture 
by comparing Americans and Dutch subjects. They observed cultural differences under 
resource overuse, when there was heterogeneity in the harvests of group members. Americans 
further exploited the resource, possibly because there was no group norm. Dutch subjects on 
the other hand, did not increase their harvests when faced with this heterogeneity, not using it 
as excuse to promote their own interest. These results are even more interesting in light of the 
findings of Liebrand & van Run, (1985), that compared American and Dutch subjects but found 
no cultural differences neither in the distribution of social motives nor in the amount of 
resources taken for self in the social dilemma game. It seems that culture differences between 
Americans and Dutch only emerge in such paradigms under extreme conditions, such as 
resource overuse. 
Social value orientation (SVO) when the resource is being overused is also predictive 
of harvest behavior. When the resource is close to depletion, prosocials respond with greater 
self-restraint than proselves (Joireman et al., 2009; Kramer et al., 1986; Loomis et al., 1995). 
The lack of reciprocation of self-restraint does not cause prosocials to abandon their own efforts 
to preserve the pool, which supports that social values reflect individual motives and not merely 
strategic concerns (Kramer et al., 1986). In contrast, proselves did not adjust their behavior 
when faced with rapid depletion of the pool, taking significantly more for themselves than 
prosocials. Under conditions of sustained pool use, the behavior of prosocials and proselves 
was similar.  
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Nevertheless, when there is noise present under resource overuse, prosocials start acting 
as proselves (Brucks & Van Lange, 2007). In this experiment, noise was introduced by 
informing participants that from time to time, the computer would take an additional point or 
two from the pool. Thus, the collective harvest was noisy in the sense that it did not necessarily 
represent the sum of the harvests made by all players. When the resource was close to depletion 
and noise was absent, prosocials exhibited greater self-restraint than proselves, replicating the 
findings of Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, (1986). However, when the resource was in 
danger of depletion and noise was present, prosocials radically shifted their behavior from 
careful conservation of a scarce resource to overusing the available resources. While the 
consumption of proselves did not vary much across conditions, prosocials consumption varied 
strongly across conditions. 
 Another factor that influences cooperation when the resource is overused relates to 
information. Loomis et al., (1995) provided subjects with different levels of feedback 
regarding the resource status: no information; categorical information (good, fair or poor 
resource status; or specific information (how many items left in pool). In the early trials there 
was no differences in harvest behavior across information conditions. However, as the pool 
became depleted (later trials), subjects provided with categorical information decreased their 
requests by a greater amount than did subjects provided specific information or no information. 
This was surprising, since authors expected the specific information group would be the most 
restrained. However, they suggest that detailed information on a declining resource can lead to 
the conclusion that others are continuing to exploit the resource and induce subjects to do the 
same, instead of reducing their harvests. This explanation is congruent with the findings of 
Messick et al., (1983).  
Not only information content matters, but timing as well (Joireman et al., 2009). 
Authors investigated how decision makers would react to repeated warnings about a depleting 
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resource about which they had little to no knowledge. Initial warnings (trial 12) were most 
effective than subsequent warnings (trials 16 and 22) and warnings were more effective when 
others’ harvests were small. Additionally, harvests were reduced when the warning emphasized 
short-term as opposed to long-term consequences, and among those subjects with a prosocial 
value orientation. 
 
 In summary, when the resource is in danger of depletion, we observe that prosocials are 
more cooperative than proselves (Brucks & Van Lange, 2007; Joireman et al., 2009; Kramer 
et al., 1986) but the former become as uncooperative as the latter when noise is present (Brucks 
& Van Lange, 2007). Regarding trust in others, high trusting individuals consume significantly 
less when the resource is in danger of depletion, comparing to “low trusters” (Brann & Foddy, 
1987; Messick et al., 1983). Differences in cooperative behavior between collective and 
individualist cultures seem to emerge only under resource overuse (Liebrand, 1984; Samuelson 
et al., 1984) with individuals within a collective culture exhibiting more restraint in such 
conditions. Finally, the effectiveness of information on restraint when the resource is in danger 
of depletion depends both on timing (Joireman et al., 2009) and on specificity of the 
information given (Loomis et al., 1995). 
 Although this was contemplated in previous sections, it is worth to point out that when 
the resource is being overused we observe more cooperation when individuals share a 
collective identity (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer & Brewer, 1984). Additionally, resource 
overuse is associated with a stronger tendency for subjects to vote for a structural change by 
appointing a leader (Messick et al., 1983; Rutte & Wilke, 1984; Samuelson & Messick, 1986). 
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What happens after the tragedy of the commons? 
To attempt to answer this question we will focus on the two studies that most closely 
resemble a post-crisis context. These studies led subjects to believe they were overusing the 
resource and then analyzed their harvest behavior in a 2nd Session. 
The study described by Messick et al., (1983) also included a 2nd Session. In the 1st 
session, they manipulated subjects’ perception of the resource use: underuse, optimal use or 
overuse; and homogeneity of harvesting behavior: low or high variance. They then allowed 
participants to vote for the election of a leader in a 2nd session and informed participants that 
they were the elected leader. Authors observed that, generally, the elected leaders in this 2nd 
session harvested much less than the 1st one and very close to the optimum level.  
The pattern of results is displayed in Figure 1.5. Subjects previously in the underuse 
condition, took more than the optimal number of points in the first trials of session 2 and 
dramatically decreased their group harvests after, taking far less than the optimum. As to the 
subjects that previously experienced optimal use condition, they started at the same level as the 
underuse subjects, but gradually declined their harvests, behaving similarly in both sessions. 
In contrast, subjects who experienced the overused condition in session 1, seemed initially 
more cautious probably due to the previous overuse, but then greatly increased their harvests 
and, when the pool size was very low, reduced them in order to avoid resource extinction, 
which corresponds to a low risk strategy. 
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Figure 1.5 Mean group harvests per trial block, for each resource use condition. Adapted from 
“Individual Adaptations and Structural Change as Solutions to Social Dilemmas,” by D. M. 
Messick and H. Wilke, M.B. Brewer, R. M. Kramer, P. E. Zemke, and L. Lui, 1983, Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, p. 304. Copyright 1983 by the American 
Psychological Association, Inc. 
 
 Finally, “high trust” subjects (who expected other group members to reciprocate self-
restraint) reliably took less than low trust subjects in the second session; and continued to take 
less even when others were overharvesting and the resource approached extinction. Although 
not evaluated in this study, the “level of trust” is probably related to subjects’ social value 
orientation.  “High trusters” should be more prosocial, since prosocial individuals tend to 
expect others to reciprocate cooperation (Bogaert et al., 2008) and continue to cooperate even 
when other group members do not reciprocate (Kramer et al., 1986). 
 Rutte & Wilke, (1984) used a similar design, manipulating resource status through 
feedback (underuse, optimal and overuse) in a 1st session and informing participants they were 
selected as leaders for a 2nd session. While in Messick et al 1983 study all participants faced 
similar resource conditions (replenishment rate) in the 2nd session, in Rutte & Wilke, 1984 
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study participants experienced the same resource conditions in both sessions. That is, subjects 
who experienced resource overuse in the 1st session (low regeneration rate), also experienced 
the same low regeneration rate in the 2nd session. Authors replicated the previous finding that 
leaders in the 2nd session harvested less than in the 1st session as a regular group member. 
Leaders coming from optimum use condition in Session 1, deal efficiently with the resource in 
session 2, guaranteeing optimal outcomes for the group. As shown in Table 1.2, leaders coming 
from overuse condition overuse the resource and leaders coming from underuse condition, 
underuse the resource.  
 
Table 1.2  
Leader harvests per group member summed up over ten trials. 
Adapted from “Social dilemmas and leadership,” by C. G. Rutte and H. A. M. Wilke, 1984, 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 14, p. 114. Copyright 1984 by John Wiley & Sons, 
Ltd. 
* p < .05 
  
For example, the elected leader who experienced resource underuse in a 1st session 
continues to underuse the resource in a s 2nd  session, despite having complete power over 
resource distribution. As authors suggest this may reflect leaders conforming to what they 
possibly perceive as a group norm. However, the fact that subjects experienced the same 
resource conditions (replenishment rate) in both sessions does not allow the comparison 
between the three conditions. Only using a similar design to Messick et al., (1983) with 
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participants facing similar conditions of replenishment rate in a 2nd session can we analyze the 
effect of resource use in a 1st session on the harvest behavior in a 2nd one. 
 
In both of these studies, the fact that subjects took the role of  leaders probably induced 
them to be more cooperative than as if they were a group member, because they were the single 
person responsible for the resource status and believed they were elected by other group 
members. It would be interesting to look into their behavior if they were selected at random to 
be the group leader in the 2nd Session. Moreover, manipulating whether or not they believed 
other members knew or not who the elected leader was. 
 
Hence, what does happen after the tragedy of the commons? The studies that closely 
resemble the experimental design that allows answering this question are the ones from 
Messick et al., (1983) and Rutte & Wilke, (1984). However, participants who experienced 
“resource overuse” did not experienced a resource crisis in terms of very early resource 
depletion. Moreover, in their “post-crisis” context (here, post-resource overuse) in a 2nd 
session, participants were acting as leaders instead of individual group members. 
 So what do these studies tell us? That, after experiencing resource overuse, subjects 
who experience a normal regenerating pool will probably be more restrained initially and 
increase their harvests over time but reducing them when the resource is in danger of depletion. 
On the other hand, subjects that, after experiencing resource overuse, again experience a slowly 
regenerating pool, will probably tend to overharvest.  
 We also anticipate an effect of social value orientation after the resource crisis. Since 
prosocials continue to exhibit restraint even if others do not, we expect that, in a post-crisis 
context, prosocials cooperate more than proselves, regardless of the resource having a low or 
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high danger of depletion. Nevertheless, the magnitude of this difference will probably be 
increased when the resource is again in danger of depletion (High Danger). 
 
FISH task: a commons dilemma simulation 
The commons dilemma we will use is the FISH 5.0 program (Aranda, n.d.). The FISH 
is a Java-based application used in research to study commons dilemmas (Gifford & Gifford, 
2000).The program uses ocean fishing as a metaphor, where fishes represent the resource. 
Fishes spawn periodically, symbolizing the regeneration of the resource. The FISH 5.0 not only 
has a modern and intuitive design, but also allows the manipulation of several parameters. 
Subjects can either play alone or with others and with human or computer fishers. The 
parameters we can manipulate are: the number of resource units (fish), participants (fishers), 
and trials (seasons), payoff values, the resource regeneration rate (spawning), harvesting greed 
by computer fishers, awareness of other harvesters' actions, among others. 
Typically, the game goes as follows: several fishers play together, harvesting as many 
fish as they want in each round, knowing each fish has a given value. After the end of each 
round, fishes spawn and the next round starts with more fish. The regeneration rate feature of 
game manipulates the amount of fishes that will spawn. Fishers’ harvesting behavior will 
determine how long the resource (fishes) will survive, because fishers’ greediness may lead to 
resource depletion if they do not restrain themselves to allow fishes to spawn at a stable rate. 
In the FISH simulation, participants can either play with real people or with pre-
programmed fishers, the latter are also called bots. The usage of bots allows the experimenters 
to control and better standardize the behavior of the “other players”. The bots’ features that can 
be manipulated are the following: name, greed, trend, greed spread and predictability (see 
Appendix B). 
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When selecting the parameters for the FISH task we accounted for the findings of 
previous studies on the situational variables that influence cooperation in a commons. We will 
briefly explain our choices of group size, privacy of choices, information on strategies and 
resource status (environmental uncertainty and resource use). When building the task there 
were two salient goals: promote cooperative behavior but simultaneously resemble a real-life 
commons management. 
In the FISH task, participants played in groups of 5 (with 4 bots). This choice of group 
size had two factors in mind. First, we wanted to promote deindividuation and diffusion of 
responsibility, two phenomena that occur in larger groups (Festinger et al., 1952; Latané & 
Darley, 1968). Most of our decisions concerning experimental design promoted cooperation, 
so why are we increasing group size knowing beforehand that it has a prejudicial effect on 
cooperative behavior? Real-world resource management problems involve large groups, with 
each member trying to maximize its own gain. Using the fishing industry as an example, there 
are several fishing companies fighting over stock and territory. Thus, the goal was to increase 
ecological validity. We actually wanted to increase group size even further but here is where 
the second reason emerges. We needed participants to believe they were playing online with 
human players and the more participants (bots) we included, the less realistic it would seem. 
Regarding the privacy of choices, we let participants’ choices be public but 
anonymous. Although there is some inconsistency regarding the effects of identifiability on 
cooperation in social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980; Williams et al., 1995) we believe this variability 
comes mainly from differences in the experimental design and that, in general, identifiability 
promotes cooperative behavior. In the FISH task, we set participants choices to be public. 
Although usually this is not the case in real life, we believe this was necessary for participants 
to believe they were playing with others online by seeing the table updating with information 
on “other players”. However, in these uncertain contexts when choices are public, subjects 
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have the tendency for social conformity (e.g. Schroeder, Jensen, Reed, Sullivan, & Schwab, 
1983). To avoid this, we set bot harvest behavior to be heterogeneous so there was no “harvest 
norm” for participants to follow. In the task, choices were also anonymous, which not only 
resembles real life situations but also eliminates the problem of gender identification. As 
mentioned earlier, there is an association between sex and cooperation moderated by the social 
context (Balliet, Li, Macfarlan, & Van Vugt, 2011) and, to avoid confounders, we opted to 
attribute participants a random code (e.g lb693) 
Providing information about strategies yields positive results in resource 
management efficiency (Hine, 1990). We opted to conceal the optimal strategy (which 
corresponded to 10 fishes per player per round) because the optimal strategy is often 
unavailable in real life. However, to avoid early depletion of the resource we told participants 
that the goal was to get as many points as possible at the end of the game and this implied 
letting the game continue for as many rounds as possible.  
Regarding environmental uncertainty, in the FISH task, there was full resource 
visibility to avoid the participants’ tendency to overestimate the pool size (Budescu et al., 1990) 
and, consequently, overharvest and reduce efficiency levels (Budescu, Suleiman, et al., 1995; 
Gustafsson et al., 1999; Hine & Gifford, 1996). Uncertainty regarding the regeneration rate of 
the pool also produces significant declines in individual restraint and group efficiency (Hine & 
Gifford, 1996). In our task, the regeneration rate was not revealed and subjects were only 
informed that fishes might regenerate faster or slower in different stages due to external 
variables such as maritime currents, etc. This possibly promoted overharvesting but we used a 
visual cue – resource turning grey – as an indicator of resource overconsumption, to counteract 
this effect. Finally, we did not reveal the number of trials in order to avoid end of game effects 
(Bar-El & Tobol, 2013). Once subjects knew which was the final round, they would take as 
much fishes as possible and deplete the resource. 
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 Finally, we manipulated resource status (in terms of overuse, optimal use and 
underuse) by changing the bots’ greed, greed spread and regeneration rate parameters (for 
further details see Method and Supplementary Materials). 
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3. From brain to behavior: glucose and decision-making 
 Previously we offered the theoretic background on human cooperation and presented 
the commons dilemma paradigm used to study it. Now we move on to understanding how 
glucose may influence cooperation. Currently there are no studies on the connection between 
glucose and cooperation and past work focused mainly on the effect of glucose on other 
categories of decision-making. This chapter begins by describing how glucose is metabolized 
in the brain, how the brain operates under different glycemic levels and presenting some models 
that attempt brain energy usage. Subsequently we present the main findings on how glucose 
influences decision-making and, finally, reflect on how it may influence cooperative behavior. 
 
Glucose in the brain 
Glucose is an obligatory energy substrate for the brain (Bélanger, Allaman, & 
Magistretti, 2011). Although the brain consists approximately of 2% of the body, it consumes 
around 20% of glucose-derived energy, making it the main consumer of glucose (Mergenthaler 
et al., 2013). Only under specific and extreme conditions, such as fasting and uncontrolled 
diabetes, are the brain’s energetic requirements sustained by other compounds (Magistretti & 
Allaman, 2015). Given glucose is the main fuel in the brain under normal conditions, it has 
become the focus of neuroenergetics, the field studying energy flow within the brain and the 
energy demands of neural function. 
The brain cannot synthesize glucose, so it requires a virtually continuous supply of 
glucose from the circulation (Cryer, 2007). How does glucose reach the brain? How is it 
metabolized? Specialized centers in the brain sense central and peripheral glucose levels and 
regulate glucose metabolism through the vagal nerve as well as neuroendocrine signals 
(Mergenthaler et al., 2013). Once glucose reaches the bloodstream it has to cross the blood 
brain barrier before entering the brain. The blood brain barrier is a membrane that separates the 
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circulating blood from the brain, allowing the passive diffusion of some molecules but 
requiring selective transport for others, such as glucose that passes through a glucose 
transporter (GLUT1). Once it reaches the brain, how does glucose support brain activity? A 
model of brain energy use suggests that a considerably larger amount of energy is spent in the 
grey matter compared with the white matter (Harris, Jolivet, & Attwell, 2012). Of constituents 
of grey matter, neurons and astrocytes are the main consumers of glucose in the brain 
(Mergenthaler et al., 2013). 
Neurons are the basic cell unit of the nervous system that receive, process, and transmit 
information through electrical and chemical signals; and communicate with other neurons via 
specialized connections called synapses, through neurotransmitters. Surrounding neurons, 
there are glial cells, which include astrocytes that are, in turn, essential for the structural and 
metabolic support of neurons, among other functions.  
Neurons and astrocytes process glucose differently and exhibit key interactions to 
produce glucose-derived energy in the form of ATP, which is considered the "molecular unit 
of currency" of cells from most organisms. Therefore, which processes consume ATP and how 
is this energy delivered? It appears that neurons consume 75-80% of the energy produced and 
consume most of it at the synapse (Harris et al., 2012) 
There has been some controversy regarding the major fuel for activated neurons and 
the models for neuron–astrocyte interactions (Mergenthaler et al., 2013). The debate circles 
around two mechanisms: Astrocyte-Neuron Lactate Shuttle and Neuron-to-Astrocyte Lactate 
Shuttle. Some members of the neurochemistry community defend that the mechanism that 
couples synaptic activity to local energy delivery is the Astrocyte-Neuron Lactate Shuttle 
(ANLS). The ANLS mechanism suggests that astrocytes predominantly process glucose 
through aerobic glycolysis to produce pyruvate and lactate; and neurons predominantly use 
oxidation of these substrates – pyruvate and lactate – to produce ATP (Magistretti & Allaman, 
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2015). The ANLS suggests that the uptake of synaptically released glutamate into astrocytes 
as a consequence of neural activity represents a key signal to import glucose into astrocytes 
and produce lactate as an energy substrate (see Appendix C). This becomes a highly efficient 
energy delivery mechanism since glutamate is the predominant signal of increased synaptic 
activity and hence increased local energy demands. Others suggested a different mechanism of 
glucose metabolism (e.g. DiNuzzo, Mangia, Maraviglia, & Giove, 2010; Patel et al., 2014). 
This mechanism is the Neuron-to-Astrocyte Lactate Shuttle (NALS), which predicts glucose is 
predominantly taken up into neurons due to their high energy demand and lactate is posited to 
be generated by neurons and taken up by astrocytes (Mergenthaler et al., 2013). However, it is 
the ANLS model that better integrates data from different methods such as positon emission 
tomography (PET), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and magnetic resonance 
spectroscopy (MRS) (Magistretti & Allaman, 2015). 
Another mechanism of neuron-glia metabolic coupling involves the mobilization of 
glycogen, which is the main the storage form of glucose in the body. Specific neurotransmitters 
and neuromodulators6 promote glycogenolysis in astrocytes, with the main ones being 
vasoactive intestinal peptide (VIP) and noradrenaline (NA) (Magistretti & Allaman, 2015). The 
brain is able to store glycogen and uses this compound when plasma glucose levels are low 
(Rooijackers et al., 2016). 
Therefore, there are two main mechanisms for coupling neuronal activity to energy 
delivery by astrocytes: aerobic glycolysis triggered mainly by glutamate (from ANLS 
perspective); and glycogenolysis, stimulated by VIP/NA. Both processes lead to the release of 
lactate from astrocytes for use by neurons with the first one predominating under normal 
glycemic conditions. These observations shifted neuroenergetics from a “neurocentric” view 
                                                 
6 Neuromodulators are a subset of neurotransmitters that, once released by neurons, diffuse through large areas 
of the nervous system, regulating the activity of multiple neurons. 
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into an integrated perspective on the metabolic complementary between neurons and astrocytes 
(Bélanger et al., 2011). 
A remarkable feature of brain energy metabolism is the tight coupling between energy 
demand and supply, reflected by the delivery of glucose and oxygen from the vasculature 
(Bélanger et al., 2011). Task-dependent increases in cerebral activity are always accompanied 
by changes in regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) and cerebral glucose metabolism (CMRglu), 
processes denoted as neurovascular and neurometabolic coupling, respectively.   
  
The previous section serves to illustrate that there is still a lot to learn about glucose 
metabolism in the brain, highlighting the cellular mechanisms and metabolic interactions 
between neurons and astrocytes under normal and abnormal blood glucose levels. Now that we 
have a basic grasp of what is known about the processes that fuel neuronal activity, let us focus 
on how are these neural processes affected by varying glucose levels.  
According to the National Institute of Clinical Excellence, the normal glycemia levels 
(normoglycemia) are between 72 and 108 mg/dL when fasting and up to 140mg/dL 2h after 
eating. Hyperglycemia occurs when there is an excessive amount of glucose in the blood 
plasma, whereas hypoglycemia occurs when blood glucose drops below normal levels and is 
defined as any blood glucose measurement that falls below 70mg/dL (American Diabetes 
Association, 2013). So, what happens as our blood glucose levels get lower? As the 
hypoglycemia progresses, we display decreased cognition (from difficulty in concentrating to 
overt confusion), aberrant behavior, seizures, coma and, with profound and prolonged 
hypoglycemia, neuronal death (Cryer, 2007).  
 There is evidence from type 1 diabetic patients demonstrating that the brain operates 
differently under hypoglycemia (Rooijackers et al., 2016). At a neurochemical level, no 
differences were observed in cerebral glucose metabolism (CMRgl) between hypoglycemia 
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and normoglycemia neither in healthy controls nor in patients with type 1 diabetes. However, 
under hypoglycemia, there is evidence of greater use of brain glycogen (both in humans and in 
rodents) and reduced brain glutamate levels in healthy controls. Data from functional and 
metabolic neuroimaging techniques suggest that, globally, cerebral glucose metabolism 
(CMRgl) is unchanged during moderate hypoglycemia7 (Rooijackers et al., 2016). However, 
on the regional level, moderate hypoglycemia causes redistribution of CBF to various brain 
areas involved in the detection of hypoglycemia where enhanced neuronal activation stimulates 
glucose uptake and metabolism. Moreover, the highest increments in regional CBF during 
hypoglycemia occur in the frontal and parietal lobes (Tallroth, Ryding, & Agardh, 1992). 
Parietal lobes are responsible for integrating multisensory information, among other functions; 
and frontal lobes are responsible for executive functions such as attention, inhibition, working 
memory, planning, reasoning and decision-making. As such, hypoglycemia is expected to 
impair these cognitive functions, and there is evidence to support it (see Feldman & Barshi, 
2007; Orquin & Kurzban, 2016 for reviews) 
 As described, the brain operates differently under hypoglycemic conditions. However, 
hypoglycemia in healthy individuals is very uncommon (Desimone & Weinstock, 2000) and 
this is due to a coordinated system that suppresses insulin8 production once glucose levels reach  
low values (Rooijackers et al., 2016). In the present work, we are interested in the altered 
cognition resulting from lower than average blood glucose levels, still under normoglycemia, 
since relatively subtle changes in glucose can influence on thought and behavior (Gailliot & 
Baumeister, 2007). As we shall discuss later, even before entering a hypoglycemic state, our 
cognitive processing is already impaired. As depicted in Figure 1.6, our glycemic levels vary 
throughout the day but only fall into hypoglycemia if we go several hours without eating. 
                                                 
7 Between 40-50 mg/dL (Davis & Lastra-Gonzalez, 2008). 
8 Insulin is a hormone responsible for blood glucose regulation. High concentrations of insulin in the 
bloodstream decrease blood glucose levels. 
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Figure 1.6  Fluctuation of blood sugar (red) in humans during the course of a day with three 
meals. Adaptated from “Pancreas islets in metabolic signaling - focus on the β-cell,” by J. 
Suckale and M. Solimena, 2008, Frontiers in Bioscience, 13, p. 3. Original from “Acute effects 
on insulin sensitivity and diurnal metabolic profiles of a high-sucrose compared with a high-
starch diet,” by M. E. Daly, C. Vale, M. Walker, A. Littlefield, K. G. MM Alberti and J. C. 
Mathers, 1998, American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 67, p.1190. Copyright 1998 by 
American Society of Clinical nutrition. 
 
How does this glycemic variability affect cognitive processes? Since human cognition 
operates within biological constraints, it is not surprising that hypoglycemia causes 
performance decrements in cognitive tasks (see Feldman & Barshi, 2007 for a review). 
Therefore, it is expected that lower glucose levels (major fuel of the brain) are associated with 
decreased cognitive resources. In other words, depriving the brain of its major energetic 
substrate results in increased cost for brain function. In chapter 1, we explained that humans 
have bounded rationality and that we use mental shortcuts (heuristics) to mitigate the cognitive 
  
69 
 
costs of complex decision-making. Now we may ask ourselves: what exactly is being spent? Is 
it glucose? Three models give different answers to this question. 
 The cost-benefit models of cognitive cost assume individuals attempt to optimally 
trade costs (leisure, opportunity cost, cognitive demand) for benefits (reward, leisure). 
However, these models totally decouple cognition from its limited biological substrate - the 
brain. Next, the limited resource models linked cognitive cost to the utilization of a limited 
resource, purportedly blood glucose (Gailliot et al., 2007). These models posited glucose as the 
physiological substrate of self-control “resource” (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 
2010). Although these models establish a bridge between a biological substrate and cognitive 
cost, they have several limitations. The most striking is that the reported decreases in blood 
sugar resulting from cognitive demanding task are too small to disrupt task performance. A 
reanalysis of the self-control literature failed to find the effect predicted by the glucose model 
of self-control (Kurzban, 2010) and the corollaries of this theory were not confirmed in a recent 
meta-analysis (Dang, 2016). 
Recently, a model of cognitive cost was suggested based on the novel idea that the brain 
senses and plans for longer-term allocation of metabolic resources by intentionally conserving 
brain activity. This optimal control model of energy use in the brain suggests that an 
individual’s decision of paying cognitive costs is strategic: he/she will only commit limited 
resources if the payoff is worth it (Christie & Schrater, 2015). Hence, what may appear to be 
aversion to cognitive effort or cognitive laziness may in fact be strategic resource allocation. 
This model uses astrocytic glycogen as a plausible basis for limited energetic reserves, 
suggesting glycogen acts as an energy buffer that can temporarily support high neural activity 
beyond the rate supported by blood glucose supply. Authors suggest the existence of a control 
system that reallocates energetic stores of glycogen to anticipate and meet the demands of 
recurrent neural activity at longer timescales. In their paper, Christie and Schrater define: 
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 System state as the resources available in different components of the brain (energy 
residing in astrocytes and neurons)  
 System dynamics as the energy flow between capillaries, astrocytes, and neurons within 
an area.  
 Control of the system as a mechanism that increases and decreases energy usage rate 
by changing the concentration of some excitatory neuromodulator. Botvinick & Braver, 
(2015) suggested dopamine as a candidate control signal. 
 Objective function as the combination of cognitive costs and rewards per time unit 
 
In sum, this optimal control model views the allocation of metabolic resources as a 
control problem with the limitation given by the dynamics of glycogen storage and use. It 
proposes the existence of a control system that optimizes energy consumption, even though no 
system is specified and future studies are required to verify or disprove this model. 
 
 The models presented above serve to illustrate that the biological processes linking 
glucose levels to cognitive cost remains an open question for future research. While this section 
focused on the molecular and cellular processes involved in glucose metabolism under normal 
and abnormal conditions, the following segment centers around one of the cognitive processes 
affected by lower blood glucose – decision-making.   
 
Glucose and decision-making 
Glucose levels influence several dimensions of human cognition (Orquin & Kurzban, 
2016). The general idea is that glucose deprivation worsens cognitive performance whereas 
glucose enrichment improves it. For instance, glucose deprived participants have poorer 
performance on mental calculation and inhibition tasks (McElroy et al., 2014). On the other 
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hand, glucose enriched subjects improve their facial emotion recognition, verbal working 
memory, spatial abilities, inhibition and processing speed. However, the idea that ingesting 
sugar will inevitably improve cognitive function is too simplistic (Gibson, 2007) and 
experimental evidence should be taken carefully. 
Evolutionary studies suggest an association between high cognitive functions in 
humans and significant expansion of our neocortex coupled with an increase in glucose 
utilization and the expression of energy metabolism genes (Magistretti & Allaman, 2015). That 
is, high cognitive functions are associated with higher energy expenditure through glucose 
metabolism, which possibly renders these functions the first to resent drops in blood glucose. 
Indeed, it is predicted that the degradation of cognitive functions as a result of declines in blood 
sugar will be stronger in high cognitive functions (Christie & Schrater, 2015), such as decision-
making. This is in accordance with evidence that higher functions such as working memory, 
attention, and executive control are more sensitive to hypoglycemia than low level functions 
as auditory acuity and basic motor functions (Feldman & Barshi, 2007).  
The studies on glucose and decision-making broadly suggests that lower glucose levels 
are associated with poorer decision-making and higher glucose levels with better decisions  
(e.g. Bos, Dijksterhuis, & van Baaren, 2012; Dickinson, McElroy, & Stroh, 2014; McMahon 
& Scheel, 2010). Literature on glucose and decision-making focused mainly on four topics: 
willingness to pay, willingness to work, future discounting and decision style.  
It seems low blood glucose increases the willingness to spend money on food but lowers 
the willingness to spend money on anything not food related; and also increases the willingness 
to work on food related tasks but decreases the willingness to work on any other task (Orquin 
& Kurzban, 2016). Moreover, glucose deprived subjects seem to increase their risk tolerance; 
increase their future discounting by placing greater value on current rewards than future ones; 
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and adopt a more intuitive rather than deliberative decision style. For the purposes of this 
project, I will focus only on these last three findings9. 
 
a. Risk tolerance 
Decision under risk can be seen as a choice between options (A, B, C) that yield 
outcomes (Xa, Xb, Xc) with a given probability (pa, pb, pc) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Human behavior under risk is somewhat surprising from a purely economic perspective. We 
sometimes exhibit risk-aversion, preferring a sure outcome over a gamble with higher or equal 
expected value; or risk-seeking, rejecting a sure thing in favor of a gamble of lower or equal 
expected value (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Several factors influence human risk attitude 
and glucose levels are one of them. Only two studies focused on this topic and both suggest 
low levels of blood glucose lead to riskier choices (Orquin & Kurzban, 2016). 
The effect of glucose on human risk-attitude in financial decisions was tested in a risk 
preference task where each trial consisted in a choice between two alternatives, one riskier than 
the other (Symmonds, Emmanuel, Drew, Batterham, & Dolan, 2010). Authors looked into 
acyl-ghrelin levels as an indicator of current metabolic state. Acyl-ghrelin, also called the 
“hunger hormone”, is highly sensitive to short-term changes in metabolic state and higher 
levels of this hormone correlate with subjective indices of hunger. Results indicate delayed 
effects of the meal (1h after) on risk attitude correlate with changes in acyl-ghrelin. Individuals 
became more risk-averse while satiated, reflected by a greater post-prandial fall in acyl-ghrelin 
(i.e. larger signal of nutrient intake). A smaller change in acyl-ghrelin levels indicating a lower 
than anticipated impact of the meal, correlated with greater risk seeking. These results are in 
accordance with prospect theory, which postulates that changes in wealth below a reference 
point induce risk-seeking behavior and earnings above a reference point promote risk aversion. 
                                                 
9 The experimental paradigm does not involve costs or work. Therefore, studies on willingness to pay and work 
are not informative on the effects of blood glucose on cooperative decision-making in our experimental task. 
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Later, another study tested participants in a risk preference task under satiated and 
deprived states where they had to choose between two rewards (Levy, Thavikulwat, & 
Glimcher, 2013). This task used money, food and water as rewards. Results indicate that 
subjects became overall more risk tolerant as they become overall hungrier and thirstier for all 
three reward types: money, food and water. When satiated, subjects showed very diverse risk 
attitudes, from highly risk-averse to weakly risk tolerant. When deprived, these risk attitudes 
converged towards a similar level of weak risk aversion, for all reward types. In summary, risk 
attitude seems to be state dependent and deprivation reduces the variance of human risk 
attitudes.  
Taken together, both studies suggest decision makers with low levels of blood glucose 
tend to make riskier choices when the outcome is either food or money (Orquin & Kurzban, 
2016). This is consistent with optimal foraging theory, which core principle of the budget rule 
proposes that animals under negative energy budgets will shift from risk averse to risk seeking. 
Nevertheless, one limitation from the previous studies is they do not provide pure measures of 
risk. Choosing the riskier choice may not reflect a more risk seeking attitude but instead the 
greater value of the riskier reward. Although the second study has the advantage of explicitly 
stating the reward probabilities, the claim that we are measuring only risk behavior is still 
inaccurate. 
 
b. Future discounting 
We discount the future when we value present goods over future goods and prefer a 
smaller and sooner reward to a larger but later reward (Wang & Dvorak, 2010). Several studies 
focused on the effect of glucose levels (through a hunger manipulation) on future discounting 
for food and non-food rewards. Since were interested in the latter, we will give it special 
attention. 
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Before getting into the effect of glucose on future discounting for food, we should 
recognize that we discount food even while satiated, that is, not glucose deprived. (Rasmussen, 
Lawyer, & Reilly, 2010) asked subjects to choose between different amounts of food at 
different delays or with different probabilities. The task consisted in questions such as: Would 
you rather eat 10 bites of your favorite food in 1h, or 2 bites in 5h?; or Would you rather eat 5 
bites of food that is certain or 10 bites of food with a 25% chance? Results indicate the value 
of food decreased with time delay or chances against receiving the food. 
Regarding the role of glucose on food-related future discounting, we discount food both 
when glucose enriched and glucose-deprived but to a larger extent when glucose-deprived 
(Hoefling & Strack, 2010; Kirk & Logue, 1997). Some other variables are associated with an 
increased future discounting for food, such as dieting (Logue & King, 1991) and higher body 
fat percentage (Rasmussen et al., 2010). Additionally, there is evidence of a gender effect, 
where women tend to make more impulsive and risk-averse choices for food, having higher 
future discounting rates than men for food items. 
Similarly, to future discounting for food, we also discount money. That is, we often 
prefer receiving less money sooner than a larger amount of money later. This phenomenon 
happens even when we are satiated, that is, under normal glucose levels. Similar to their 
experiment on future discounting for food, Rasmussen, Lawyer, & Reilly, (2010) tested 
subjects for money discounting. Participants had to choose between different amounts of 
money available after different delays: would you rather have $10 in 30 days or $2 at the end 
of the session?; or with different probabilities: would you rather have $5 for sure at the end of 
the session or $10 with a 25% chance?. Results indicate the value of money decreased with 
time delay or chances against receiving the money.  
Interestingly enough, we need not to manipulate subjects’ glucose levels to elicit 
differences in money discounting. It seems the sheer presence of certain food stimuli (visual or 
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olfactory) is sufficient to increase money discounting rate (Li, 2008). In a first experiment, 
subjects were randomly assigned to an appetitive condition (dessert pictures), nonappetitive 
condition (neutral pictures) and control condition (no picture). Then they had a temporal 
orientation task with choice items such as would you rather have $10 tomorrow vs $12 in 25 
days and later a vice vs virtue task choosing between alternatives such as would you rather hire 
an attractive vs a competent job candidate. Experiment 2 used the scent of food (cookies) to 
manipulate the appetitive state, followed by two tasks: 1) happiness ratings of monetary gains 
at different points of time; 2) and hypothetical purchase decisions. Results from both 
experiments indicate: subjects faced with appetitive stimuli were more present oriented and 
preferred smaller-sooner rather than larger-later monetary gains; preferred vice options to 
virtue options; were less happy with distant monetary gains; and were more likely to buy 
unplanned products under a very tight budget.  
Having established how we typically discount money, the following studies analyze 
how glucose modulates money discounting. Not surprisingly, glucose-deprived subjects 
discount money further than glucose-enriched ones. Authors manipulated subjects’ blood 
glucose levels by instructing participants not to eat before the experiment and have them drink 
either a sugary drink – experimental condition – or a drink with artificial sweetener – control 
condition (Wang & Dvorak, 2010). They then completed the final future-discounting task, 
which consisted in questions such as Would you prefer $120 tomorrow or $450 in 31 days?. 
Results indicate subjects with higher blood glucose levels increased the value placed on future 
rewards (less future discounting); and subjects with lower blood glucose increased the value 
placed on current rewards (more future discounting).  
 A recent study produced some unexpected results, although they generally support 
previous findings. Kuhn, Kuhn, & Villeval, (2014) asked participants to choose between 
receiving smaller tokens sooner or a higher amount later, with payment dates varying in five 
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weeks intervals - 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 weeks. To manipulate glucose levels, there were four 
conditions: 1) sugar drink; 2) placebo drink (sugar flavored only); 3) baseline (no drink); 4) 
depletion (no drink and depleting task10). Unexpectedly, the depletion group reduced future 
discounting and authors suggested the ’attention/focusing’ effect of engaging in the depleting 
task primed subjects to think more carefully about their subsequent economic decisions. 
Drinking either the placebo beverage or the sugared beverage, reduced future discounting, in 
comparison to baseline, although the magnitude of the effect was significantly greater for the 
sugar group than the placebo. The fact that the placebo group also reduced future discounting 
in comparison to the baseline condition was somewhat surprising. However, recent studies 
showed that rinsing one’s mouth with a sugary drink, even without swallowing, boosts self-
control in similar ways to ingesting sugar – “rinsing effect” (see Dang, 2016 for a meta-
analysis; Molden et al., 2012; Sanders, Shirk, Burgin, & Martin, 2012). Detecting 
carbohydrates in the mouth, even without ingesting them, may signal the possibility of reward 
and motivate physical effort. Thus, this could explain the increase in self-control in the placebo 
condition (vs baseline) observed by Kuhn et al., (2014), given their placebo drink contained a 
small amount of sugar. 
 
Taken together, the analysis of future discounting revealed a significant, negative main 
effect of blood glucose levels, with no significant differences between the food- and nonfood-
related tasks (Orquin & Kurzban, 2016). However, results suggest a moderator effect with low 
blood glucose increasing the future discount rate for food and to a lesser extent the discount 
rate for nonfood. This phenomenon of discounting hypothetical primary rewards (like food) 
                                                 
10 The depletion task used was the Stroop task, a self-control task believed to  reduce blood glucose levels (e.g. 
Gailliot et al., 2007), although a recent meta-analysis indicates it does not (see Dang, 2016) 
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more steeply than secondary rewards (such as money) is referred as the domain effect 
(Rasmussen et al., 2010). 
 
c. Decision style 
This section focuses solely on non-food domain studies regarding the effects of glucose 
on decision style. Here, decision style is characterized either as more intuitive/unconscious or 
as more deliberative/conscious. This relates to the dual process theory of cognition, that, 
recapitulating, differentiates two types of cognitive processing: 1) one that is fast, automatic, 
effortless, associative and difficult to control - intuition system; and another that is much 
slower, serial, effortful, rule-governed and deliberately controlled - reasoning system 
(Kahneman, 2003). 
There is evidence suggesting low glucose levels influence decision-making style, even 
in experts. This research examined if judges were able to decide in a rational and deliberative 
manner or if there were also psychological factors influencing judicial rulings (Danziger, 
Levav, & Avnaim-Pesso, 2011). Judges had two daily food breaks – a morning snack and 
lunch, breaking the day into three distinct “decision sessions.” These breaks possibly 
replenished judges’ mental resources either through rest, improving mood or by increasing 
glucose levels. The judges’ decisions on prisoner’s requests were classified into two categories: 
“accept request” and “reject request”, with the latter being the default outcome. Authors found 
the likelihood of a favorable ruling –   “accept request”11 – was greater at the beginning of the 
workday or after a food break, as displayed in Figure 1.7. 
                                                 
11 The majority of the decisions consisted of parole requests; the remainder consisted requests to change the terms 
of their parole (e.g., remove a tracking device) or requests to change the terms of their incarceration (e.g., prison 
relocation). 
  
78 
 
 
Figure 1.7 Proportion of rulings in favor of the prisoners by ordinal position. Adapted from 
“Extraneous factors in judicial decisions,” by S. Danziger, J. Levav and L. Avnaim-Pesso, 
2011, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, p. 6890. 
Circled points indicate the first decision in each sessions; tick marks on x axis denote every 
third case; dotted line denotes food break 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
The data suggests that when judges make repeated rulings, they increased their tendency 
to accept the default outcome: reject the prisoner’s request. However, taking a break to eat a 
meal, overcomes this tendency. We cannot say if only resting or eating would produce the same 
effect on mental resources. Nevertheless, these results do indicate that extraneous variables, 
possibly subjects’ glucose levels, can influence judicial decisions. The following studies are 
less vulnerable to confounding variables such as mood and rest and clarify that glucose does 
indeed influence decision-making style.  
Higher glucose levels seem to improve learning of probabilities, favoring a deliberative 
type of processing (McMahon & Scheel, 2010). In this study, participants drank either regular 
beer or diet sugar-free beer before working on a probability-learning task where they tried to 
predict which of two events would occur on each trial. Results indicate that ingesting sugar 
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before working on a probability learning task promoted probability matching. There were no 
differences in reaction times between groups: even though glucose enhances overall processing 
speed, it also promotes more deliberation, which is more time consuming.  
In line with the previous study, Dickinson et al., (2014) found higher glucose levels are 
also associated with improved weighing of outcome probabilities. Participants fasted three 
hours before the experimental session and drank either sugary lemonade (glucose condition) or 
sweetened lemonade with no sugar (placebo condition). Fifteen minutes later, they completed 
a Bayes switching task, where they could earn $10 or $0 per trial. In each trial, they had to 
decide between two options by weighing outcome probabilities. This dual option task allowed 
separating Bayesian decision makers (using the reasoning system) from those who follow a 
more simple reinforcement heuristic (drawing from the intuition system). Regarding reaction 
times: participants in the glucose condition took significantly longer to respond initially, 
indicating they were more deliberative; but reduced their reaction times overall when compared 
to the placebo group, suggesting a significant glucose impact on learning. As to choice quality, 
the probability of making a Bayesian choice (higher quality) rather than a reinforcement choice 
(low quality), was higher in the glucose condition. These results indicate a beneficial glucose 
effect on overall quality of choice in the Bayesian task. 
Adding to the idea that higher glucose levels promote a deliberative type of processing 
(system 2), glucose-enriched subjects actually improve the quality of their deliberative choices.  
(Bos et al., 2012). Participants were asked not to eat or drink three hours prior to coming into 
the lab. Half the participants were given sugary 7-Up and the other half sugar free 7-Up and 
then saw a neutral video so glucose could have an effect on the brain. Next, participants read 
information about 8 hypothetical items that varied in degree of quality. Each item was 
described by several positive and negative attributes. Then, they were randomly assigned to a 
conscious thought condition (requires mental effort, eliciting the reasoning system) – “think 
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about the information carefully for 4min so you can later make a decision”; or unconscious 
thought condition (effortless, promoting intuition system to operate) - saw an unrelated movie 
clip. After, participants gave their attitude toward each of the 4 options from 1 (very negative) 
to 20 (very positive). Conscious deliberation improved subjects’ ratings, measured by greater 
ability to distinguish good from bad options, when blood glucose levels were increased. 
Surprisingly, performance after unconscious processing actually declined when blood glucose 
was increased. Authors concluded that conscious deliberation yields the best results when 
blood glucose levels are elevated whereas unconscious thought leads to better results when 
glucose levels are reduced.  
We already established high glucose levels promote the reasoning system to operate. 
Likewise, we observe that under lower glucose levels we turn to the intuition system instead 
(Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008). Using a similar manipulation of glucose levels authors 
focused on the attraction effect – an indicator of intuitive processing. Subjects ingested a drink: 
sugary lemonade (glucose group) or lemonade with sweetener and no sugar (placebo group). 
Participants watched a video and were instructed to form an impression on the person there 
depicted. Half of the participants were asked to ignore some visual cues, which requires some 
mental effort and exerting cognitive load (depletion group); and the other half had no further 
instructions (no depletion condition). Finally, they completed a consumer decision task. 
Authors were interested in the effects of glucose on the attraction effect, where a difficult 
choice between two options is swayed by the presence of a seemingly irrelevant ‘‘decoy’’ 
option. The attraction effect is an indicator of intuition system processing since there is no 
logical reason for the attraction to occur. This effect was strongest in the depleted-placebo 
group and they exhibited a significantly larger attraction effect than participants in the no-
depletion conditions. This supports the idea that depleting cognitive resources increases 
heuristic and intuitive processing. Within the depletion condition, the glucose group exhibited 
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a smaller attraction effect than the placebo group. This finding also indicates that glucose intake 
eliminates the effect of resource depletion on decision-making and restores deliberative choice. 
The analysis of these studies yielded a significant positive effect of blood glucose levels 
on decision style, with low blood glucose increasing the propensity to make intuitive decisions 
rather than deliberate ones, on non-food related tasks. (Orquin & Kurzban, 2016). 
 
One limitation of the abovementioned studies on decision style, future discounting and 
risk tolerance is most of them do not present a measure of blood glucose levels. To make sure 
the glucose manipulation results in significant differences between groups, in our study we 
measured subjects’ blood glucose levels directly. 
 
Glucose and cooperation 
 Currently there are no studies focusing on the effects of blood glucose on cooperative 
behavior. However, the research presented above on the effects of glucose on decision-making 
might be informative regarding its effects on human cooperation. Let us consider the three 
main pieces of evidence gathered and reflect about how these might translate into our 
experimental paradigm. 
 Firstly, the qualitative analysis on glucose and risk suggests that higher glucose levels 
are associated with more risk aversion and lower glucose levels with greater risk seeking. 
Hence, we expect that in the FISH task, glucose enriched subjects opt for a “safer strategy” in 
comparison to glucose-deprived participants. The task has some degree of uncertainty, namely 
regarding how other players will behave, despite their choices being public, and concerning 
the regeneration rate of the pool. We expect that risk averse subjects (here, our glucose group) 
will be more cooperative, since this is the strategy involving less risk. In other words, we expect 
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risk seekers (here, our placebo group) will be more competitive, since this is a higher risk 
strategy. 
 Secondly, the literature on future discounting indicates that glucose enriched 
participants discount the future to a lesser extent than glucose deprived subjects. That is, 
subjects with high glucose tend to value more the larger and later rewards than subjects with 
low glucose. This notion is key to successful resource management in the FISH task. 
Consequently, we expect subjects with higher blood glucose to be more cooperative and 
successful in the experimental task. 
 Thirdly, the few studies conducted on decision style demonstrate that glucose 
deprivation is associated with an intuitive type of processing while glucose enrichment 
promotes a deliberative processing style. In one-shot games, the rational choice is to defect 
whereas in repeated games, such as the FISH task, the best strategy is to cooperate. The Social 
Heuristics Hypothesis suggests that, in repeated games, both intuitive and deliberative 
processing styles promote cooperation since: 1) it is intuitive to cooperate; 2) deliberation 
yields strategic cooperation, as confirmed in a recent meta-analysis (Rand, 2016). Thus the 
SHH predicts no differences on cooperative output despite different processing styles. 
However, we expect that a deliberative processing style will result in improved resource 
management. 
 Finally, regarding post-crisis behavior we expect that the glucose-enriched group is 
again more cooperative. Following a resource overuse period (crisis), it was demonstrated by 
a single study that if subjects act as leaders they were more cooperative in the initial trials, 
reducing their harvests (Messick et al., 1983). They subsequently increased their harvests over 
time but again reduced them when the pool size was low. This is a low risk strategy and, for 
this reason, we expect it from the glucose-enriched group. We anticipate this at least for the 
Low Danger condition of Stage 3. For the High Danger condition, the glucose group can either 
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be more cooperative than the placebo again revealing a safer strategy; or as competitive as the 
placebo once they realize the resource is again in danger of depletion. 
 Moreover, it is expected that subjects’ social value orientation will influence 
cooperative behavior on the FISH task, although no interactions with the glucose manipulation 
are anticipated. We expect to replicate previous results, with prosocials being more cooperative 
than proselves across all conditions (e.g. Balliet et al., 2009; Budescu, Au, & Chen, 1997; 
Joireman, Posey, Truelove, & Parks, 2009; Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986; Liebrand, 
1984; Liebrand & van Run, 1985; Loomis, Samuelson, & Sell, 1995; Parks, 1994; Roch & 
Samuelson, 1997). 
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 II. Method 
Design 
The experiment consisted in a 2 Glucose (glucose vs. placebo) x 2 Danger (High vs. 
Low) factorial design, between subjects. 
 
Sample  
Subjects were male and female volunteers, between the ages of 18 to 60 years old. The 
exclusion criteria were participants diagnosed with diabetes or hypoglycemia; and hemophilia 
or blood coagulation problems. Subjects were recruited through non-probability “snowball” 
sampling method, where each one was encouraged to ask their friends or family if they would 
be interested in participating.  
Sample size was defined based on the standard effect size in psychology (0.5) using 
GPower (version 3.1) software. The required sample size to achieve a power of 0.8 with an α 
= 0.05 would be 64 participants per experimental group, amounting to a total N of 256 in our 
2 x 2 design. We were only able to analyze data from 47 participants (around 12 participants 
per experimental group). 
Ethical approval of this project was granted by Comité de Ética e Deontologia da 
Faculdade de Psicologia e Instituto de Educação da Universidade de Lisboa. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested either individually or in groups (maximum of 3) in a quiet room 
where the experimenter was also present during the entire experimental session. Upon arrival, 
subjects read the informed consent sheet (Appendix D). Immediately after, the experimenter 
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asked if they had any further questions and made sure he/she understood how the experimental 
session would proceed. 
Participants sat before a computer screen, opened a qualtrics link and a welcome 
message appeared. Then, participants were asked to drink a beverage that was placed in front 
of them. Half of the participants drank 350 ml of sugary apple juice (brand Pingo Doce) - ~37g 
of sugar  - and the other half drank 350ml of sweetened apple juice (brand Continente), a 
sweetened but sugar-free drink - 0g of sugar (similar procedure used in Masicampo & 
Baumeister, 2008; McElroy, Dickinson, & Stroh, 2014; McMahon & Scheel, 2010). 
Participants were unaware of the glucose manipulation.  
After drinking the whole cup, subjects answered a liking index (2min) for the drink they 
just had to assure there were no differences in drink likability across groups. Both drinks were 
previously pretested with N=15 and there were no significant differences in drink likability. In 
the pretest, subjects were instructed to rate the quality of two competing juice brands, coded as 
“A” and “B”. Drink order was counterbalanced across subjects. 
Afterwards, they completed the Social Value Orientation task, which took 
approximately 5min (Appendix E). Following the SVO task, subjects filled some demographic 
information regarding their age, gender, nationality and education level. We also asked them 
how long it had been since their last meal/snack and about their sleeping habits. Finally, 
subjects saw the video tutorial explaining how to play the FISH program (3min) - 
youtu.be/mDHMYB0dHgk. The video tutorial was recorded using Active Presenter (version 
6.0) and the sound quality was improved through Audacity (version 2.1.2). In the tutorial, 
participants were presented with the display they would see during the task (Appendix F).  
The time spent answering the liking index, SVO task, demographic information and 
watching the tutorial amounted to the 10-12min necessary for necessary for glucose in a liquid 
to have an effect on the brain (Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008). At this point, we measured 
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the participants’ blood sugar levels using a One Touch Select Plus glucometer (2min). Since 
we tested several subjects, each participant used a different lancet (puncture needle), so that 
everyone used completely sterilized material. The procedure went as follows: a lancing device 
was used to puncture the subjects’ fingertip (ring or little finger) of their non-dominant hand, 
which was previously sterilized using an alcohol wipe. The participant gently massaged his/her 
fingertip until a round drop of blood formed. The blood drop was absorbed by a paper strip, 
which was inserted into the glucometer, providing a reading of glucose levels seconds later. 
The used lancet was thrown away. To assure this procedure went with the necessary 
precautions and minimal discomfort, the experimenter received training to use this device by a 
healthcare practitioner. 
Later, subjects started the FISH task, which took around 10min. Participants were told 
they would play with other people who were currently online. Actually, they were playing with 
pre-programmed fishers – bots. The reason for using bots instead of real players was for us to 
be able to control and better standardize the behavior of the “other players”. Subjects began by 
playing 3 practice rounds to get acquainted with the task display and response buttons. Then, 
the experimental trials began, and these were divided into 3 stages. Subjects were told that 
fishes might regenerate faster or slower in the different stages.  
In Stage 1, subjects played up to 10 rounds with mostly cooperative bots and the 
resource had a low danger of depletion. In Stage 2 there was a crisis, the resource depleted in 
the 3rd round if not sooner. In Stage 3, subjects were assigned to either a low danger condition 
(similar to Stage 1) or a high danger condition (with mostly competitive bots), playing up to 
10 rounds as well. In the low danger condition, the bot parameters were the same as in Stage 
2. In the high danger condition, bots were much greedier than in Stage 1, but not as much as in 
Stage 2. For a more detailed description each Stage parameters’, see Supplementary materials. 
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After finishing the task, subjects answered two final questions. First, one regarding their 
perception of the other players (bots) to assess if subjects believed they were playing with 
human players. Secondly, we asked them about their previous experience with these type of 
social dilemma games. Lastly, participants read information explaining the intentional 
deception of the experiment and gave their written consent (Appendix G). 
 
Hypothesis 
Stage 1:  
H1) Glucose group cooperates more than placebo  
H2) Prosocials cooperate more than proselves  
Stage 3:  
H3) Low danger: glucose group cooperates more than placebo  
H4) High danger:  
H4a) Glucose group cooperates more than placebo  
H4b) No differences in cooperation levels between glucose and placebo groups 
H5) Prosocials cooperate more than proselves in both Low and High danger conditions 
  
 Hypothesis 2 and 5, regarding the influence of social value orientation on cooperation, 
are predictions from the data obtained in previous studies that we expect to replicate. Prosocials 
will probably be more cooperative than proselves (Hypothesis 2), in accordance to the vast 
literature on SVO and cooperation in a commons (e.g. Balliet et al., 2009; Budescu, Au, & 
Chen, 1997; Joireman, Posey, Truelove, & Parks, 2009; Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 
1986; Liebrand, 1984; Liebrand & van Run, 1985; Loomis, Samuelson, & Sell, 1995; Parks, 
1994; Roch & Samuelson, 1997). We also anticipate prosocials will again cooperate more after 
the crisis (Hypothesis 5), including in the High Danger condition, since they continue to 
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cooperate even if others are overusing the resource  (Brucks & Van Lange, 2007; Joireman et 
al., 2009; Kramer et al., 1986; Loomis et al., 1995). 
 Hypothesis 1 (Stage 1) follows from the literature on glucose and decision-making, 
since there on glucose and cooperation. Since glucose-enriched subjects are more risk-averse 
and incur less in future discounting, we expect the glucose group to be more cooperative than 
the placebo (Orquin & Kurzban, 2016). 
Hypothesis 3 and 4 (Stage 3) are mostly exploratory since there is no evidence that 
suggests how glucose will influence cooperative levels after a critical event and at different 
levels of danger of resource depletion (High vs Low danger). 
Regarding Hypothesis 3 (Low Danger), we expect the glucose group to be more 
cooperative than the placebo given subjects who previously overused a resource use a low risk 
strategy: are more cautious initially, increase their harvests and then reduce them if resource 
size is low (Messick et al., 1983). Since glucose-enriched subjects are more risk-averse, we 
expect them to exhibit a safer and more cooperative strategy as well. 
 Concerning Hypothesis 4 (High Danger), we have two contradictory predictions. We 
expect the glucose group to be either more cooperative than the placebo, again revealing a safer 
strategy; or as competitive as the placebo, once they realize the resource is once more in danger 
of depletion and try “getting while the getting is still good” (Kramer et al., 1986). 
 
Cooperation is operationalized through the following measures: the number of rounds 
played, number of fishes at the end of each stage, number of fishes left at the end of each round 
and individual restraint or efficiency measures. 
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 III. Results 
Participants 
We tested 64 participants but 5 were excluded. Three subjects did not understand the 
task; one subject mistook the final round as the 4th instead of the 12th; and one participant who 
received the placebo drink later revealed having eaten an hour ago. This left 59 participants for 
analysis, out of which 12 exhibited a proself social value orientation and 47 a prosocial 
orientation. The small number of proself individuals did not allow for a statistical analysis and, 
therefore, the following results concern only the individuals with a prosocial orientation. For 
statistical analysis, we used IBM SPSS (version 23) software and used an alpha level of .05. 
All 47 participants exhibited a native speaker comprehension of the Portuguese 
language, out of which 30 were females and 17 males. Their ages ranged from 18 to 60, with 
an average age of 35.96 years (SD=13.3). The majority of participants (87.3 %) had a graduate 
or higher level.  
 
Drink quality 
The quality of both drinks (placebo and glucose) was assessed by a Liking Index, 
composed by 3 Likert scale questions: 1) How do you rate the general quality of the drink? 
(from 1 “Low quality” to 7 “High quality”); 2) How pleasant was the drink? (from 1 “Not 
pleasant at all” to 7 “Very pleasant”); 3) How difficult was to drink it? (from 1 “Not difficult 
at all” to 7 “Very difficult”). A total score for drink quality was calculated by adding the scores 
of each item, with the last one being reverse-scored. This yielded a Drink Quality Score with a 
minimum of 3 and a maximum of 21. Since there was homogeneity of variances across drink 
groups, a rank test was used. A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that the quality of the placebo 
drink (Md = 16,5) did not differ from the quality of the sugary drink (Md = 16), U = 253, p = 
.623, r = .07. 
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Glucose manipulation 
The distributions of glucose levels were not normal but homogeneity of variances was 
verified. A Mann-Whitney U test revealed that the blood glucose levels of participants who 
received the sugary drink and placebo differed significantly, U = 25, p < .001, r = .78. The 
blood glucose of participants in the glucose condition (Md= 112 mg/dL) was significantly 
higher than the level of participants in the placebo condition (Md= 92 mg/dL). The average 
time interval between the blood glucose measurement and finishing the drink was 14minutes 
(SD=2) and was never below 10 minutes. 
 
Social Value Orientation 
Social value orientation was assessed through the 6 primary items of the Social Value 
Orientation Slider Measure (Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011).  Each item presents 9 
different distributions of imaginary money between the self and another player. The options 
varied the amount allocated to the subject and the “other player”, thus allowing to categorize 
subjects’ choices as more altruist, cooperative, competitive or individualist. To avoid item 
order effects, this task had two item sequences that were counterbalanced across subjects.   
 The set of responses yielded a single score for the decision maker (see Appendix H). 
This measure was reduced to nominal categories, for comparability with previous studies. The 
resulting SVO Slider angles range from -16.26º to 61,39º. Individual scores can be diminished 
to one of four categories: 1) Altruism: SVOº > 57.15º; Prosociality: 22.45º < SVOº < 57.15º; 
Individualism: –12.04º < SVOº < 22.45º; and Competitiveness: SVOº < –12.04º. Subjects with 
22.45º < SVOº < 61,39º were categorized as prosocial and subjects with -16.26º < SVOº < 
22.45º were categorized as proself. Our initial sample consisted mainly of prosocials, with 47 
prosocials (46 prosocials, 1 altruist) and 12 proselves (11 individualists, 1 competitive). For 
the reasons stated previously, we analyzed only data from the prosocial individuals.  
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Harvest behavior 
Stage 1 
In Stage 1, there were no differences in the number of rounds played, with Md = 10 for 
both drink groups. This indicates subjects were cooperative enough to get to the final round. 
For the subsequent analysis, data from the 10 rounds was collapsed into 5 trial blocks in order 
to simplify data visualization and interpretation.   
Regarding the number of fishes left in the pool at the end of each round, a 2 x 5 ANOVA 
with drink (glucose x placebo) and trial block as between-subject factors revealed a main effect 
of trial block F(4,10) = 58.84, MSE = 7.29,  p < .001, η2 = .96. As trials advanced, the nº of 
fishes left in the pool at the end of each round was lower than the previous. This was expected, 
since the average bot greed was 0.5, and two of the bots were set to slowly increase their greed. 
Nonetheless, the degree of the pool decay was higher than anticipated, indicating participants 
harvested above optimal level (10 resource units per player). No differences in this measure 
were observed as a function of drink, F(1,10) = .139, MSE = 7.29, p = .717 , η2 = .01. Hence, 
Hypothesis 1 – Glucose group will be more cooperative than placebo in Stage 1 – was not 
confirmed. No other differences were observed at this point. 
 
Stage 3 
Measures of cooperation 
There were no differences in the number of rounds played in Stage 3 with Md = 10 for 
the four groups (2 drink x 2 danger). Even in the High Danger condition, where the bots were 
significantly greedier, most participants cooperated enough to get to the final round. 
Regarding the nº of fishes at the end of each round, in the Low Danger condition, a 2 x 
5 ANOVA with drink (glucose x placebo) and trial block as between-subject factors revealed 
main effect of trial block, F(4,10) = 60.12, MSE = 8.99,  p < .001, η2 = .96. With each trial, the 
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number of fishes left in the pool at the end of each round became lower. Again, this was 
expected due to the experimental manipulation. Results indicated a trend in the predicted 
direction for drink, F = (1, 10) = 4.52, MSE = 8.99, p = .059, η2 = .31. Participants in the 
glucose group tended to leave more fishes in the pool at the end of each round than participants 
in the placebo group, indicating the former was more cooperative. This tendency favors 
Hypothesis 3, which stated the glucose group would be more cooperative than the placebo, in 
both danger conditions of Stage 3. 
Concerning the nº of fishes at the end of each round in the High Danger condition, a 2 
x 5 ANOVA with drink (glucose x placebo) and trial block as between-subject factors revealed 
main effects of drink, F(1,10) = 5.49, MSE = 11.49, p = .041, η2 = .35 and trial block, F(4,10) 
= 47.02, MSE = 11.49, p < .001, η2 = .95. As can be seen in Figure 3.1, the nº of fishes at the 
end of each round was lower as trial blocks progressed but was significantly higher in the 
glucose group, indicating they were significantly more cooperative than the placebo group.  
Figure 3.1 Mean fishes at the end of each round, per trial block, as a function of drink 
manipulation in the High Danger condition of Stage 3. 
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These results support Hypothesis 4a), which stated we expected the glucose group to be more 
cooperative than the placebo in Stage 3. 
 
Measures of efficiency 
 Respecting the nº of points at the end of each round in Stage 3, no comparisons were 
made between the two danger conditions (High and Low) since they are not comparable. 
Within each danger condition, no differences in the total points were observed between drink 
groups. No differences in the individual efficiency measure were observed in the Low Danger 
condition. In the High danger condition, a 2 x 5 ANOVA with drink (glucose x placebo) and 
trial block as between-subject factors revealed an interaction between trial block and drink, 
F(4, 10) = 6.52, MSE = .01, p = .008 , η2 = .72. This interaction is depicted in Figure 3.2.  
Figure 3.2 Mean individual efficiency per trial block as a function of drink manipulation, for 
the High Danger condition of Stage 3. 
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The glucose group was highly efficient in the initial trials but became less efficient as trials 
progressed, whereas the placebo group began with low efficiency and slightly increased it as 
trials advanced. Results indicate a trend in the predicted direction for drink, F(1,10) = 4.71, 
MSE = .01, p = .055, η2 = .32. That is, generally the glucose group tended to be more efficient 
than the placebo, which again supports Hypothesis 4a. 
 
Stage 1 and Stage 3 (Low danger) 
No a priori hypothesis were established regarding subjects’ harvest behavior in the 
Stages 1 and 3, and the further analysis was exploratory. To examine the effect of the crisis 
experienced in Stage 2 on subjects’ harvest behavior, we compared only Stage 1 with the Low 
Danger condition of Stage 3, given both had the same settings (bots had the same greed). The 
fact that in the High danger condition bots were much greedier made it impossible to compare 
with Stage 1. 
Regarding the nº of fishes at the end of each round, a 2 x 5 x 2 ANOVA with drink 
(glucose x placebo), trial block and Stage (Stage 1 x Stage 3 Low danger) as between-subject 
factors revealed a main effect of Stage, F (1, 20) = 7.38, MSE = 8.14, p = .013, η2 = .27. After 
experiencing the crisis in Stage 2, subjects in the Stage 3 left less fishes at the end of each round 
than in Stage 1. This indicated subjects were generally less cooperative after experiencing the 
crisis. Results indicated a trend interaction in the predicted direction between drink and stage, 
F (1,20) = 3.35, MSE = 8.14, p = .082, η2 = .14. After experiencing the crisis, the glucose group 
maintained harvest behavior similar to Stage 1, but left slightly less fishes at the end of each 
round. The placebo group tended to harvest more during Stage 3, leaving less fishes at the end 
of each round. Taken together, this indicates that in a post-crisis context, when there is Low 
Danger of resource depletion, subjects tend to be more competitive and that this effect tends to 
be stronger for the placebo group. 
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As to the individual efficiency, a 2 x 5 x 2 ANOVA with drink (glucose x placebo), trial 
block and Stage (Stage 1 x Stage 3 Low Danger) as between-subject factors revealed a trend 
interaction between drink and Stage, F = (1, 20) = 3.20, MSE = 0.02, p = .089, η2 = .14. The 
glucose group tended to have higher efficiency in Stage 3 than Stage 1 (Figure 3.3B), while the 
opposite was true for the placebo group, which had a lower efficiency in Stage 3 (Figure 3.3A). 
Interestingly, the glucose group presented a decay in efficiency during the middle trials of both 
Stages, while the placebo group was relatively stable across trials. 
Figure 3.3 Mean individual efficiency per trial block in Stages 1 and 3, for the placebo (A) and 
the glucose group (B). 
 
Bot manipulation 
To verify if subjects believed they were playing with human players, we asked them 
this indirectly through the following question: At least one of the players was a bot (pre-
programmed player). Please select which one(s). Subjects could select as many players as they 
wanted or I don’t know. We considered the manipulation to be successful if subjects selected I 
don’t know or just one player. The more players they selected, more likely it was they did not 
believe they were playing with human players. The majority of participants selected either one 
of players to be a bot or “I don’t know” (95.7%), so we considered the manipulation successful.  
B A 
  
98 
 
Previous dilemma experience 
Previous experience in these types of social dilemmas was assessed by asking at end of 
the experiment: The game you just played is a version of a social dilemma. What is your level 
of experience or familiarity with these types of social dilemma games? (from 1 “No experience” 
to 7 “A lot of experience”). Overall, participants reported to have an average experience with 
social dilemma games (Md=4, Mo=5). 
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 IV. Discussion 
Interpretation of results 
We can summarize our results into three main findings. First, participants in the glucose group 
were generally more cooperative and more efficient in managing a resource after a crisis, 
especially when the resource was in higher danger of depletion. Secondly, the crisis seems to 
have a positive effect on individual efficiency in a subsequent stage for the glucose group, with 
the opposite being true for the placebo group. Thirdly, the glucose manipulation seems to have 
elicited different resource management strategies. The placebo group appears to be consistently 
less efficient than the glucose group. The glucose group seems to be as or more efficient in 
initial trials, reducing efficiency in the middle trials and recovering efficiency levels towards 
the end (reducing them again in the final rounds). In other words, the efficiency of the glucose 
group resembles a “zig-zag” pattern with its peaks and dips, while a straight horizontal line 
better describes the placebo group’s efficiency. We now present a more detailed description of 
subjects’ behavior for each Stage. 
 In Stage 1, and contrarily to our initial hypothesis, no significant differences were 
observed. The effect of the glucose manipulation was observed only after the crisis, in Stage 3 
and its magnitude was greater in the High Danger than the Low Danger condition. Although 
there were no differences between drink groups in cooperation or efficiency indexes in Stage 
1, an interesting pattern emerged in both individual restraint and efficiency measures. Both the 
placebo and the glucose group started off with the same level of restraint (0.28) and efficiency 
(0.55) but the glucose group decreased IR and IE in the middle trials (lower than the placebo 
group), increasing them again in the final rounds. The placebo group displayed a steady 
increase, but still ended with lower IR and IE than the glucose group in the final rounds. This 
pattern is again present in the Low Danger condition of Stage 3. To put these results in 
perspective, we need to consider that perfect efficiency would receive a score of 1 and a 
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sustainable restraint pattern would receive a score of 0.5. Therefore, our participants were far 
from an optimal harvesting pattern. 
For Stage 2, we did not present any data since there were at most 3 rounds due to the 
high greed of all the other bots. Consequently, subjects’ behavior would be uninformative since 
they would only realize the resource was in danger when it was too late. Some subjects 
displayed genuine expressions of surprise at Stage 2: “they [other players] are idiots, they are 
gonna end with all the fishes” or “this jo [bot jo827] is really greedy”. Some subjects even 
showed embarrassment and were apologetic for the Stage ending so soon, as if taking most of 
the responsibility for the early depletion. 
In the Low Danger condition of Stage 3, participants in the glucose group tended to 
leave more fishes in the pool at the end of each round than participants in the placebo group, 
indicating the glucose group seemed to be more cooperative than the placebo. Although there 
were no observable significant differences in the efficiency measure under the Low Danger 
condition, the pattern of results of the glucose and placebo groups was quite different. The 
glucose group began with higher efficiency (average IE of 0.68), had a sharp decrease in the 
middle trials (average IE of 0.42) and again recuperated in the final trials (average IE of 0.69). 
The placebo group maintained a constant efficiency level throughout all trials, with an average 
IE of 0.47. Although there were no differences in individual restraint, a somewhat similar 
pattern was observed: the placebo group slowly increased its IR whereas the glucose group 
again exhibited a decay and then an increase in IR. 
 The High Danger condition of Stage 3 was the one where most significant differences 
emerged between drink groups. There was a significant interaction between drink and trial 
block. The glucose group was very efficient in initial trials (average IE of 0.91) and lowered 
steeply as trials progressed. Contrarily, the placebo group started with much lower efficiency 
levels (average IE of 0.41) and slightly increased it over time. Moreover, there was a main 
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effect drink regarding the number of fishes left at the end of each round, which was 
significantly higher in the glucose group, indicating they were significantly more cooperative 
than the placebo group. Although we observed no differences in individual restraint, the pattern 
of results was again quite different between drink groups. Here, the glucose group began with 
moderate restraint levels (average IR of 0.48), maintained it in the middle trials and decreased 
it in the final rounds (average IR of 0.38). The placebo started with very low restraint (average 
IR of 0.27) and increased it steadily, ending with an average IR of 0.56 in the final rounds. 
 To examine the effect of the crisis experienced in Stage 2 on subjects’ harvest behavior, 
we compared Stage 1 with the Low danger condition of Stage 3. Participants in Stage 3 (Low 
Danger) were generally more competitive than in Stage 1, leaving less fishes at the end of each 
round. However, this main effect of Stage is mainly due to the placebo group. Additionally, 
there was a trend interaction in the predicted direction between drink and stage. After 
experiencing the crisis, the glucose group maintained a similar the harvest behavior displayed 
in Stage 1. Conversely, the placebo group tended to harvest more during Stage 3, leaving less 
fishes at the end of each round. Regarding their resource management efficiency, the crisis 
seems to have a different impact in participants with different glucose levels. The glucose group 
tended to increase their efficiency from Stage 1 (average IE of 0.5) to Stage 3 (average IE of 
0.58), adjusting their behavior in light of the crisis of Stage 2. Conversely, glucose deprived 
participants had a tendency to have lower efficiency from Stage 1 (average IE of 0.56) to Stage 
3 (average IE of 0.47). For the placebo group we observe a steady efficiency level in both 
Stages 1 and 3 while for the glucose group we observe, for both Stages, initially higher 
efficiency, lower in the middle trials, recuperating again in the final ones. 
  
 Our finding that the glucose group is generally more cooperative and efficient in 
managing a resource after a resource crisis matches with our predictions from the literature on 
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glucose and decision-making in terms of risk and future discounting. That is, the increased 
cooperation in the glucose group may be a consequence of greater risk aversion or less future 
discounting (by placing greater value in larger rewards in the future than in smaller and more 
immediate ones). These results also support the literature on the effects of glucose on self-
control behaviors, such as impulsivity, attention control, emotion regulation, crime and 
aggression, stress coping, smoking and alcohol consumption, with higher levels being 
associated with more self-control (see Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007 for a review). In the FISH 
task, the glucose group increased cooperation may reflect their ability to restrain from 
harvesting in order to preserve the resource longer. 
Surprisingly, no significant differences between glucose and placebo emerged during 
Stage 1 and we only observed differences after the crisis (Stage 3) and with greater magnitude 
in the High Danger condition. For Stage 1 we expected the glucose group to be more 
cooperative and efficient than the placebo. The fact that no differences were observed at this 
point suggests that Stage 1 was mostly exploratory and that, after the crisis in Stage 2, the 
glucose group was able to adapt to new scenario while the placebo did not.   
 In Stage 3, the Low and High Danger conditions had the same regeneration rate, varying 
only the bots greed and greed spread, which were increased in the High Danger condition. In 
the High Danger, we observed larger differences between drink groups in cooperation and 
efficiency indexes, comparing to the Low Danger condition. The High Danger condition 
requires greater adaptation or change in subjects’ harvest behavior for a successful resource 
management than the Low Danger condition. The glucose group tended to be more cooperative 
than the placebo in the Low Danger condition and was significantly more cooperative and 
efficient in the High Danger condition. This suggests the glucose group was better able to adapt 
to the other players increased harvests in the High Danger condition, by reducing their harvests.  
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    When we compare Stage 1 and 3 (only Low Danger) we observe the glucose group 
became more efficient while the placebo reduced their efficiency, although the major difference 
was in initial trials. Since the Stage 3 (Low Danger) had the same settings as Stage 1, this 
suggests that the crisis event was perceived differently by drink groups and was perhaps more 
salient for the glucose group.  
Regarding the third main finding on the different resource management strategies used 
by the glucose and placebo groups, we can establish a parallel with previous studies. The 
placebo group was consistently less efficient than the glucose group, with the latter exhibiting 
a ziz zag pattern. Messick et al., (1983) observed that subjects that had previously experienced 
resource overuse, were, in a second session, initially more cautious but then greatly increased 
their harvests and, when the pool size was very low, reduced them. This is a relatively safe risk 
strategy and corresponds to the data pattern of our glucose group.  
Overall, subjects were much more competitive and less efficient than we expected, as 
revealed by the number of fishes left at the end of each round and the efficiency measure.  
Nevertheless, most subjects did not deplete the pool before the final round (round nº 10), 
demonstrating they understood the need to let the game continue but with some, particularly 
the placebo group, not changing their behavior in accordance to the other players’ harvests. 
The low cooperation in general is even more striking once we consider all participants exhibit 
a prosocial value orientation.  
 
 Previously we reflected upon our findings in detail and in relation with previous studies. 
The following section examines our results in light of the theoretical framework that guided 
this work. According to the Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH), and reinforcing Simon’s 
theory on human docility, humans tend to cooperate intuitively (Rand et al., 2014; Zaki & 
Mitchell, 2013). This idea is supported by several empirical studies on human cooperation in 
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social dilemmas (e.g. Rand, 2016; Rand & Nowak, 2013). The SHH considers cooperative 
decision-making within the dual-process framework, proposing a connection between intuition 
and cooperation. SHH suggests that, in repeated games when there is the perspective of future 
consequences of the present action, both intuition and deliberation promote cooperation. 
Promoting intuitive processing leads to cooperation because we cooperate intuitively; and 
promoting deliberation leads to the rational strategy in such contexts, which is strategic 
cooperation. In our study, and going back to the literature on glucose and decision-making, 
glucose enrichment induces deliberative processing to override intuition while glucose 
deprivation promotes intuitive processing. Thus, and according to the SHH, no differences are 
expected between our glucose group (more deliberative) and our placebo group (more 
intuitive). Although they incur in different decision processing styles, both are expected to 
yield cooperation in repeated games such as the FISH task. As predicted by the SHH, no 
differences between placebo and glucose groups were observed at Stage 1 our task. However, 
after the critical event, the glucose group tended to be more cooperative than the placebo when 
there was a Low Danger of resource depletion; and was significantly more cooperative and 
efficient than the placebo under High Danger of depletion. The first observation suggests the 
glucose group may have perceived the crisis as a more critical event than the placebo. The 
second observation indicates the glucose group adapted their behavior in function of the 
overharvesting of the other players while the placebo did not. The SHH does not account for 
this phenomena and we believe our results could possibly be informative for this theory. It is 
our belief that the suggested link between intuition and cooperation is too simplistic. In our 
view, there is one step missing: intuition promotes heuristic processing which may, in turn, 
promote cooperation or not. That is, the heuristic used depends on the conditions of the social 
dilemma.  
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For instance, in some commons the most salient heuristic may be the equal division 
heuristic, which is a readily evoked rule that prescribes that whatever is being allocated should 
be divided equally among the participants (Allison & Messick, 1990). In other words, it is a 
simple choice rule easy to apply that is socially defensible as fair allocation. This idea is 
supported by Roch, Lane, Samuelson, Allison, & Dent, (2000) study, which proposes a 2 stage 
model of resource overconsumption. They propose that members of groups sharing resources: 
1) first anchor their consumption choices on the equal-division” heuristic; 2) and then, given 
sufficient cognitive capacity, adjust their choices in a self-serving direction. As in the dual 
process framework, we first use intuitive processing and, if sufficient cognitive resources and 
motivation, deliberation overrides the previous step. 
 However, promoting an intuitive processing type may not necessarily evoke the 
previous heuristic. For example, we would expect that individuals with high social dominance, 
who desire to dominate others and prefer hierarchical to equal relations, would not resort to 
this heuristic, possibly because they did not integrate this as a heuristic in the first place. 
As observed in our results, the placebo group that possibly incurred in a more intuitive 
processing, did not resort to the equal division heuristic. Many factors may have caused this, 
namely, seeing other players overharvesting, not knowing which was the equal division rule, 
etc. Other social heuristics may be used instead such as the previously described tit for tat. For 
example, Rand & Nowak, (2013) concluded from their study that, in repeated settings, it is 
intuitive to reciprocate: cooperate if others have cooperated and defect if others defected, which 
is the definition of the tit-for-tat. Our findings seem to go somewhat in line with this in the 
sense that, in the High Danger, the placebo group (possibly more intuitive) was more 
competitive, reciprocating the greed of other players. Or, in other words, they conformed to the 
overharvesting behavior of some players, replicating previous findings (Kramer et al., 1986; 
Messick et al., 1983; Rutte & Wilke, 1984; Schroeder et al., 1983). However, in the FISH task 
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(High Danger of Stage 3) the behavior of other players was heterogeneous: one bot harvested 
at a suboptimum level, another at optimum and the other two overharvested. The higher 
competitiveness of the placebo group may indicate participants conformed to the 
overharvesting of some players. This would strengthen Rutte & Wilke, (1984) findings: even 
if people are in a privileged position (leaders deciding how much to allocate to each 
participant), they conform to what they perceive to be the group norm. In their study, leaders 
who previously experienced a resource being overused as “normal” group members again 
overused the resource when they became leaders. Thus, one possible explanation for our 
findings is that the placebo group conformed to the perceived group norm.  
Another explanation for these findings is participants followed a social heuristic of 
imitate the majority, following the behavior of the two bots that were overharvesting. This 
heuristic states to look at a majority of people in your peer group, and imitate their behavior 
(Gigerenzer, 2008). However, we believe that the placebo group mostly followed a imitate the 
successful heuristic that says to look for the most successful person and imitate his or her 
behavior (Gigerenzer, 2008). The task’s goal was for each subject to get as many points as 
possible at the end of the task. Participants may have perceived the greediest bot [jo827] as the 
most successful and guided their behavior by his. Some subjects even reported using the 
strategy of trying to get at least one more fish than the bot jo827, which reinforces this idea. 
Another “golden rule” some participants reported to use was stop harvesting once the resource 
turned grey, demonstrating they understood the basic idea of the task.  
 
 Now we will focus on how some of the individual variables (reviewed in chapter 2) 
which might explain participants’ behavior in the FISH task: participants’ previous dilemma 
experience, gender and social value orientation and expectations. 
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 We asked participants about their previous dilemma experience since experienced 
players perform better in the commons dilemma (Gifford & Hine, 1997; Hine, 1990). However, 
we believe that the reported previous dilemma was highly inflated. Several subjects later 
revealed they understood the question concerned their experience with social dilemmas in daily 
life (e.g. at work, within their social circle, etc.) and not regarding actual experience with social 
dilemma games. The reported previous experience was “moderate” (Md = 4 out of a 1-7 Likert 
scale) but we actually believe it was much lower, since this contact with game theory and social 
dilemmas is common only among psychology and computer science degrees. Thus, we 
consider our sample was generally naïve to this sort of economic games, idea favored by our 
global finding of overharvesting behavior. 
 Regarding participants’ gender, our sample was mainly composed of women 
(approximately 64%). Although no significant sex differences in cooperation in social 
dilemmas were reported in a recent meta-analytic review, it seems that men become 
increasingly more cooperative than women as rounds advance (Balliet, Li, et al., 2011). Since 
our sample had a larger percentage of women, this could have introduced some unwanted 
variability. This study by Balliet, Li, et al., (2011) also revealed that men cooperate more than 
women in same-sex interactions but women are the more cooperative gender in mix-sex 
interactions. To avoid confounders, participants were given a random code (e.g. lb482) that did 
not identified them as males/females. 
 Concerning participants’ social value orientation (SVO), the analyzed sample 
consisted only of individuals with a prosocial orientation since there was not enough proself 
oriented individuals to compare with. We know that in commons dilemmas, prosocials harvest 
significantly less than do proselves (e.g. Balliet et al., 2009; Budescu, Au, & Chen, 1997; 
Joireman, Posey, Truelove, & Parks, 2009; Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986; Liebrand, 
1984; Liebrand & van Run, 1985; Loomis, Samuelson, & Sell, 1995; Parks, 1994; Roch & 
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Samuelson, 1997). Although the distribution of prosocials and proselves in our sample did not 
allow for any statistical comparisons, the initial data seems to go in the predicted direction with 
prosocials being more cooperative than proselves. However, a larger sample is required to 
replicate this effect of prosociality and to verify how different SVO modulates post-crisis 
behavior in both High and Low Danger conditions. We expect prosocial individuals to be 
always more cooperative than proselves, even when the resource is in danger of depletion, 
replicating previous findings (Brucks & Van Lange, 2007; Joireman et al., 2009; Kramer et al., 
1986; Loomis et al., 1995). One could argue that since prosocials have greater trustworthiness 
and higher expectations that others will reciprocate cooperation (Balliet et al., 2009; Dawes et 
al., 1977; Kramer et al., 1986; Liebrand, 1984) the crisis probably consists in a greater violation 
of expectations for prosocials. Nevertheless, we do not expect this to shift results in the 
direction of prosocials becoming as or more competitive than proselves, since the only scenario 
examined so far in which prosocials act like proselves is under conditions of noise (Brucks & 
Van Lange, 2007). 
 
Limitations 
This section addresses the three major limitations of this project related to the sample, 
glucose manipulation and measurement, and the experimental task. 
Our sample size was much lower than required for robust statistical testing, meaning 
the statistical analysis allows only looking at tendencies in the data. Moreover, the sample was 
biased towards female college students, leading to unequal representation of gender and 
education level of the population. Additionally, all of our participants were volunteers and 
gained no reward for completing the task. Volunteer subjects have certain characteristics (e.g. 
Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1976) and this certainly introduced a bias towards prosocial individuals 
in our sample, since prosocials are naturally more cooperative and volunteering.  
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We recruited participants through the “snowball” sampling method, asking each 
participant to encourage other people to participate as well. This sampling method is most 
useful for difficult to access populations and is mainly used in qualitative research (Atkinson 
& Flint, 2001). Although this method can have several advantages, it creates a selection bias, 
since participants are not randomly selected and depend on the referrals of the first participants, 
thus limiting to generalize the findings to the population. To overcome these shortcomings, the 
experimenter recruited people from different academic backgrounds, age groups and socio-
economic status who, in turn, recruited future participants from their social networks. 
Consequently, our sample became more diverse and more representative of the general 
population than the usual samples comprising only psychology college students. 
Concerning the glucose manipulation, participants were tested at different times of the 
day. Blood sugar levels fluctuate during the day (Krishna, Kota, & Modi, 2013) and this might 
have introduced some unwanted variability. However, we controlled for this by asking all 
participants to fast for 3 hours before the experimental session, as in previous studies (Bos et 
al., 2012; Dickinson et al., 2014). Some participants in the placebo group reported their last 
meal was between 2-3h ago instead of at least 3h, which possibly mitigated some differences 
in glucose levels between drink groups. An additional confounder for the glucose manipulation 
relates to participants’ diet and physical activity, which influence glycemic metabolism and 
control (e.g. Mikus et al., 2012; Rizkalla, Bellisle, & Slama, 2002). Initially our design was 
double-blind in regard to the glucose manipulation: participants were unaware of a placebo 
condition and the experimenter did not know which drink was the sugar-rich. A third party was 
asked to code the drinks with A or B and write the correspondence between drink and letter in 
an envelope, to be opened only after data analysis. However, during data collection the 
experimenter became aware of which drink corresponded to each code, since the experimenter 
measured and registered the participants’ blood glucose levels. During the experimental 
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sessions, the presence of another person in charge of the glucose measurements is required to 
assure a double-blind design. 
Glucose measurement also poses a problem, since we are only inferring brain glucose 
levels through glucose levels in the bloodstream. This measure might not accurately represent 
changes in the brain, however, it is known that brain glucose levels are approximately 15–20% 
of blood levels (Dunn-Meynell et al., 2009). An additional constraint was only measuring 
glucose levels once. Ideally, we would have measured blood glucose levels twice: before 
ingesting the drink and 10-12min after, allowing us to verify if participants’ blood glucose 
levels significantly increased in that time period. Two main reasons forced us to make only one 
measurement: added cost (additional paper stripes and lancets) and increasing discomfort for 
participants. Despite glucometers not being as reliable as laboratory analysis for estimating 
blood glucose, they are a low-cost and less time-consuming tool. 
As to the FISH program, the task was not exactly the same for all subjects, although we 
programmed bots equally for all (greed parameters). For example, in Stage 1 bots had an 
average greed of 0.5 (together they took the optimal amount of fishes per round) and the 
resource decay varied only due to the participants harvest behavior. Although this results in 
different game patterns for different subjects, this is common in iterated social dilemma 
paradigms and seems to be a better solution than the resource feedback procedures used in 
previous research (Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Messick et al., 1983; Rutte & Wilke, 1984). In 
these studies, participants harvest as many items as they wanted and were given feedback about 
the status of the resource. This means that subjects who harvested very different amounts could 
receive the same resource feedback, which is likely to introduce some confounders. 
 To induce a resource crisis in Stage 2, we lowered the replenishment rate (from a factor 
of 2 to a factor of 1.5) and also increased bots’ greed, otherwise they would adjust their harvests 
by taking very little or none of the resource. Our goal was actually to maintain bot behavior 
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constant (social environment) and vary only the replenishment rate instead (physical 
environment). By doing so, we would be able to separate the response to the crisis (created by 
external factors) from the response to the behavior of other group members. Since the task 
parameters did not allow for manipulating only the physical environment, we had to change 
the social environment (bot behavior) as well.  
Another potential problem was subjects not believing they were playing with others and 
realizing they were playing with a program. We controlled for this by asking them: At least one 
of the players was a pre-programmed bot. Please select which one(s). The rationale is the more 
players they select, the stronger the belief they were playing with bots and not humans. If they 
selected the option I don’t know or one player, we considered subjects believed they were 
playing with other participants. The majority of subjects (95.7%) chose one of the bots or I 
don’t know, so we considered the manipulation successful. However, the question framing 
might have been misleading, given some participants reported they did not know they could 
select more than one, although it was explicitly stated.  
For all stages, the predictability of action parameter was always set to be regular, which 
makes bots’ behavior seem less human but brings the advantage of standardizing the bots’ 
behavior across subjects. To avoid the loss of credibility in other players being human, we 
inserted a short message in the instructions explaining the table with information about other 
players had a slight delay because it was updated regularly and simultaneously. Still, this 
created a discrepancy between the harvest speed of participants and bots, with the latter being 
much slower. One possibility to overcome this obstacle is allowing participants to only harvest 
1 fish per second (at the same pace as the bots do). 
Finally, we should consider if we are really looking at cooperation in our study. Here 
we consider the social science’s definition, of cooperation as behaviors that maximize common 
profit (Vohs & Baumeister, 2007). The commons dilemma definitely allows operationalizing 
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cooperation, among other variables of interest. The commons dilemma can be seen as a 
cooperation/competition phenomenon; as a coalition and intragroup power phenomenon; as a 
communication and group information-processing phenomenon; as a problem-solving and 
group adaptation phenomenon; as a complex reinforcement and reward-guided phenomenon; 
and as an analog of experimental crisis (Edney & Harper, 1978a). The question remains: 
participants refraining their harvests, and paying the immediate cost of having less fishes now 
in order to preserve the resource for as long as possible, reflects cooperative behavior? To 
answer “yes” participants need to be motivated towards the goal of the task: to get as many 
points as possible in the end. We believe participants were motivated but future studies should 
give a monetary reward at the end of the game that depends on their performance to assure 
motivation (e.g. give 1/8 euros of the points they gather).  
 
Implications for future research 
 Firstly, it would be interesting to add another post-crisis condition in the FISH task. Our 
conditions of Low and High Danger aimed to represent different patterns of resource use: one 
closer to optimal use and the other to overuse, respectively. A third post-crisis condition of 
resource underuse could bring some additional insights. We anticipate the results would largely 
depend on the homogeneity of others harvests. In this underuse condition, would the glucose 
group underharvest in order to avoid another crisis, exhibiting a risk averse behavior? 
Alternatively, would they realize they could harvest a little more than the others without risking 
depletion? Would the placebo group conform to the behavior of other players or would they 
become more competitive due to their increased risk seeking? Another variable that will 
possible be determinant for the post-crisis behavior is group identification, since a stronger 
group identity has been shown to increase cooperation in a commons (Baird, 1982; Brewer & 
Kramer, 1986; Kramer & Brewer, 1984). 
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Secondly, a follow up study should consider informing the participants about the 
optimal strategy, to avoid confounders arising from exploration of the best strategy. In the 
present research, we only told participants that the goal was to get as many points as possible 
at the end of the game and this implied letting the game continue for as many rounds as 
possible. With the observed low cooperation levels, especially since our data concern only 
prosocial individuals, we consider the above information was insufficient to promote better 
resource management. Future studies should consider giving the exact optimal strategy (in 
terms of how many fishes each player should take per round) and observe how participants 
deviate from this strategy. It would be very interesting to observe how participants with 
different glucose levels deviate from said strategy under the different conditions of resource 
use.  
Thirdly, future research replicating a resource crisis in dilemmas such as the FISH task 
should attempt to create the critical event by changing the physical environment (replenishment 
rate of the pool) and not the social behavior (other players’ behavior). Therefore, results would 
reflect participants’ response to the crisis (created by external factors), separating it from the 
response to the behavior of other group members.  
Additionally, future studies should consider manipulating the said optimal strategy: true 
optimal, underharvest, overharvest. Imagine the optimal strategy is for each fisher to take 10 
fishes per round. This would be the information given in the true optimal condition. In the 
suboptimal information conditions – underharvest and overharvest – the experimenter would 
say the optimal strategy is for each fisher to take 6 or 14 fishes per round, respectively. It would 
be interesting to see how participants under different glucose levels behave across conditions. 
When the true optimal strategy is given, would the placebo and glucose groups stick to it? 
Would they adjust their harvests once they realize they were given the suboptimal strategy? An 
additional interesting manipulation concerns the heterogeneity/homogeneity in other players’ 
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harvests. Will the different pressures for social conformity (high pressure in homogeneity and 
low in heterogeneity conditions) determinate if participants go outside the “instructed optimal 
strategy”? Would the current level of blood glucose have an effect? This would be a 3 x 2 x 3 
x 2 design with resource use (optimal, suboptimal, overuse), drink (glucose vs placebo), 
strategy (underharvest, true optimal, overharvest) and variability in others harvests (high vs 
low). Since acceptance without full evaluation is at the core of this docility mechanism that 
supports the notion of intuitive cooperation, would the placebo group adhere to the suboptimal 
strategies when the pressure to conform is high? How would the level of resource use 
determinate their behavior? Future research should address these questions. Given the previous 
experimental design is too complex, with excessive independent variables and levels, future 
research would probably benefit splitting it by manipulating less variables in each study. 
 Future research would also benefit from measuring other variables such as social 
dominance orientation (SDO), risk seeking and social desirability. SDO is the extent to which 
one desires that one's group dominates and becomes superior to other groups, reflecting 
whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal or hierarchical (Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) An individual's levels of SDO may influence their contribution to 
social equality or inequality and is negatively correlated with empathy, tolerance, communality 
and altruism. The SDO probably is inversely correlated with the SVO and individuals who 
score higher in the social dominance measure will probably be more competitive in the task. 
The few studies on the effects of glucose on risk suggest that glucose deprivation increases risk 
seeking (Levy et al., 2013; Symmonds et al., 2010). However, the individual’s tendency for 
either risk seeking/aversion will probably be the starting point and the glucose manipulation 
may shift it up or down. Finally, social desirability is the tendency for individuals to portray 
themselves in a generally favorable fashion (Martin Guha, 2010). Considering participants’ 
choices in the FISH task were public, knowing others could see their responses possibly 
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induced participants who score high in social desirability measures to cooperate. The original 
measure created for a non-pathological population by Crowne & Marlowe, (1960) or one of 
the more recent short-forms (e.g. Fraboni & Cooper, 1989) are appropriate to assess this.  
Future studies should also seek to include other behavioral measures like reaction times, 
as well as electrophysiological ones, such as pupillometry and eye gaze, measured with 
eyetracking; and brain rhythms, using electroencephalogram (EEG). Response times would 
allow for stronger inferences about the processing style dominating participants decisions: 
more intuitive if reaction times are shorter and more deliberative if they are longer. 
Pupillometry may provide interesting correlates of participants’ surprise during the crisis in 
Stage 2, since there is evidence suggesting increased pupil dilation signals surprise (Preuschoff, 
’t Hart, & Einhäuser, 2011). We would expect this only if participants were truly motivated for 
the task. Increased pupil dilation is also associated with higher cognitive load (Granholm & 
Steinhauer, 2004). Having this in mind, we would expect our placebo group (higher cognitive 
load) to have greater average pupil dilation; and that prosocials had increased pupil dilation, 
comparing to proselves, during the crisis at Stage 2, since they have higher expectations of 
cooperation and the crisis would produce a greater error signal. Additionally, eye movements 
measured by eyetracking could reflect what is more salient in the task: the behavior of other 
players, the resource status, which player is the most observed, etc. 
The EEG could be useful to look into brain rhythms, specifically the alfa (8-15Hz) and 
theta waves (4-7Hz). These waves have increased power when participants are in a glucose-
enriched rather than fasting state (>8h) in the whole brain and are especially prominent in the 
frontal and parieto-occipital regions (An, Jung, Kim, Lee, & Kim, 2015). It would be an 
interesting neurophysiological correlate of cognitive load to observe higher power of alfa and 
theta waves in our glucose group in comparison to placebo. 
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Future studies should consider focusing on which heuristic is more salient. This 
probably depends on several situational variables (such as the tasks’ social structure, group 
size, etc.) and individual ones, such as risk-seeking, previous dilemma experience, SDO and 
SVO, among others. Once more, we point out that our results concern only the effects of 
glucose on cooperation of individuals with a prosocial value orientation. Future research should 
look to include individuals with a proself orientation as well. As mentioned above, we expect 
that prosocials will cooperate more than proselves, replicating previous findings (e.g. Balliet 
et al., 2009; Budescu, Au, & Chen, 1997; Joireman, Posey, Truelove, & Parks, 2009; Kramer, 
McClintock, & Messick, 1986; Liebrand, 1984; Liebrand & van Run, 1985; Loomis, 
Samuelson, & Sell, 1995; Parks, 1994; Roch & Samuelson, 1997). No interaction between 
glucose levels and social value orientation is anticipated from the literature. However, it is 
likely that, when an intuitive processing style is promoted (by lowering glucose levels), the 
most salient heuristic for prosocials and proselves will differ. In sum, this new approach on the 
SHH not only accounts for our results but also may explain the observed differences between 
prosocials and proselves. 
 
 For further support of the heuristic hypothesis, it would be interesting to incorporate a 
social simulation approach, from the field of computation. The idea would be to run simulations 
with 4 bots programmed as we have before and one programmed to learn. This last bot would 
search for the optimal solution or strategy with the goal of obtaining the maximum number of 
points at the end of the game. This “learning bot” could be, in different simulations, 
programmed with different search algorithms for problem solving. For a bot/agent to solve a 
problem there are two main types of search methods: blind search and informed search (Russell 
& Norwig, 2010). The blind search does not use any additional information about the problem 
besides the problem definition itself whereas the informed search uses problem-specific 
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information, which drastically reduces the search process, rendering the search more efficient. 
The latter uses a heuristic function to estimate the cost of the cheapest path from the initial state 
to the final state (solution). Not strikingly, this definition of heuristic closely resembles the one 
provided by the social sciences. By creating different heuristic guided search algorithms, we 
could compare not only the bots’ performance across search conditions (particularly, different 
heuristic functions) but also to model participants’ behavior in such settings and compare it 
with the empirical data. 
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 V. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to understand how different glycemic levels influence 
our decision to cooperate in a post-crisis context. Our blood glucose levels fluctuate 
significantly during the day and this variability influences our decision-making. Therefore, the 
present work analyzed for the first time the effects of different blood glucose levels on human 
cooperative behavior in a social dilemma and explored the said effect after a critical event, a 
resource crisis.  
We observed participants with higher blood glucose were more cooperative only in a 
post crisis context and mainly when under greater danger of resource depletion. Our findings 
do not imply a direct causal link between brain glucose and cooperation but instead that blood 
glucose levels influence decision-making processes, as demonstrated in previous studies; 
adding that it can influence cooperative decision-making in some contexts.  
Reflecting upon our results, we suggest that lower blood glucose levels are associated 
higher cognitive load that, in turn, promotes an intuitive processing type, boosting the use of 
certain social heuristics. Future research should address which social heuristics are more salient 
in different post-crisis scenarios, under different blood glucose levels. Combining methods 
from Psychology, Neuroscience and Computation, thus integrating different areas of Cognitive 
Science, could expand our understanding on cooperative decision-making. 
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Appendix A - Prisoner’s Dilemma game description 
In the game, two players choose to cooperate or defect and receive a payoff that depends upon 
the interaction of their choices. Each of the four possible outcomes is associated with a different 
payoff. The original payoff matrix used by Albert Tucker consists in the following: if both 
players cooperate (CC), each one receives 2€; if one cooperates and the other defects (CD or 
DC), the cooperator gets nothing and the defector receives 3€; if both players defect (DD), each 
earns only 1€. The studies we will present use this standard payoff matrix. 
 
 
Adapted from Payoff matrices in Wikipedia, n.d., Retrieved July, 14, 2016 from http:// 
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Prisoners_dilemma.png. Copyright by the Free Software 
Foundation. 
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Appendix B – Bot parameters 
 Greed: (value from 0 to 1) 0 causes bots to take no fish, 0.5 causes them to fish at an 
exactly sustainable rate, and 1 causes them to take all fish possible;  
 Trend: (stable, increasing or decreasing) a bot with a stable trend will behave the same 
way at the beginning and at the end of the simulation. A bot with an increasing trend 
will be as greedy as time goes by (while still being as greedy as specified on its Greed 
parameter, on average). A bot with a decreasing trend will be less greedy in later rounds. 
 Greed spread: this parameter sets the bots’ greed change over time 
 The lowest greed will be: base greed - (greed spread / 2) 
 The highest greed will be: base greed + (greed spread / 2) 
 The season-to-season increment or decrement is calculated by: (highest greed - 
lowest greed) / (number of seasons - 1) 
 Predictability of action: can be erratic or regular. If erratic, bots behave non-
deterministically. They may or may not act at any given moment of the simulation - 
adds to realism.  
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Appendix C - Schematic representation of the astrocyte-neuron lactate 
shuttle (ANLS) 
 
Adapted from “Brain energy metabolism: focus on astrocyte-neuron metabolic cooperation,” 
by M. Bélanger, I. Allaman and P. J. Magistretti, 2011, Cell Metabolism, 14, p. 729. Copyright 
2011 Elsevier Inc. 
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Appendix D: Informed consent 
 
Este estudo surge de uma colaboração entre as Faculdades de Psicologia, Ciências e Medicina 
da UL, supervisionado pelo Prof. Leonel Garcia-Marques e Profª Ana Sebastião. O objectivo 
deste projecto consiste em analisar o efeito de uma bebida açucarada na tomada de decisão. 
Esta sessão terá uma duração de cerca de 35 minutos. 
 
Vai começar por beber uma bebida açucarada e realizar uma tarefa de alocação de bens. De 
seguida, irá participar no jogo online FISH que está a ser desenvolvido no âmbito de um 
projecto das unidades curriculares de Teoria dos Jogos I e II. O jogo demora cerca de 10min. 
 
Antes de começar o jogo, vamos medir o seu nível de glicemia usando um glucómetro – 
aparelho usado na diabetes.  Para tal, faz-se uma pequena picada no dedo anelar/mindinho 
(usando uma lanceta) para expôr uma gota de sangue, o que pode causar um desconforto ligeiro. 
De seguida, usa-se uma tira de papel para absorver a gota de sangue e insere-se a tira no 
glucómetro. Segundos depois, obtém-se uma leitura do seu nível de açúcar sanguíneo. Cada 
participante irá usar uma lanceta diferente, de modo a assegurar que todo o material é 
completamente esterilizado.  
Se sofrer de diabetes, hipoglicémia, hemofilia ou tiver dificuldades de coagulação sanguínea, 
pedimos-lhe que não participe para sua própria segurança. 
 
A sua participação é voluntária, pelo que pode negar a sua participação ou, a qualquer 
momento, desistir. Contudo, se optar por desistir ou não responder a alguma questão, não 
poderemos utilizar os seus dados. As suas respostas são confidenciais. 
 
Quando este estudo estiver terminado, se tiver alguma questão ou interesse em receber os 
resultados globais, por favor dirija-se a casqueiro@campus.ul.pt - email da investigadora. 
 
Se compreendeu os seus direitos e pretende participar, assinale a caixa abaixo com “X”. 
 
           Compreendi e aceito participar 
 
Obrigada!  
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Appendix E: Social Value Orientation task 
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Appendix F: Task display (at beginning of Stage 1) 
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Appendix G: Written consent 
 
Para verdadeiramente analisar as variáveis de interesse deste estudo houve dois aspectos que 
não lhe pudemos revelar inicialmente. No jogo online FISH, não chegou a jogar com outros 
participantes que estavam online mas sim com jogadores pré-programados. Além disso, 
informámo-lo que iria beber uma bebida açucarada, cujos efeitos eram o interesse do estudo. 
Contudo, apenas metade dos participantes receberam uma bebida açucarada (~35g açúcar), 
sendo que a outra metade bebeu uma bebida placebo (bebida com adoçante, 0g açúcar).  
Assim, o objectivo deste estudo consistirá em analisar os efeitos de diferentes níveis de glucose 
no sangue, no desempenho da tarefa FISH.  
Para indicar que autoriza a utilização dos dados recolhidos para o objectivo deste estudo, faça 
uma rúbrica abaixo:  
_____________________________  
(rúbrica do participante) 
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Appendix H: SVO calculation (Murphy et al., 2011) 
 
 
 
_ 
AO = mean allocations for other 
_ 
AS  = mean allocations for self 
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The parameters of each Stage – greed, trend, greed spread and regeneration rate – were 
selected after conducting several simulations. In these simulations, we focused on the general 
decay of the pool.  
In each simulation, the experimenter participated as one player, since it was not possible 
to conduct simulations without an “active player”. The behavior of the experimenter is 
described for each simulation. Below we present the results for the simulations of each Stage, 
where the y axis represents the number of fishes in the pool and the x axis represents the round. 
In blue we observe the number of fishes at the beginning of each round and in red the number 
of fishes at the end of the round. 
For Stage 1, the parameters were set so that the resource slowly decayed, but with low 
danger of depleting. In Stage 2, the goal was to deplete the pool very soon. To achieve this, the 
bots’ greed set very high and the regeneration rate of the pool was lowered. Stage 3 had two 
variations: low threat (same as Stage 1); and high threat. We do not present results for the “Low 
threat condition of Stage 3, since the parameters are exactly the same as the ones set for Stage 
1.In the high threat condition, we chose the parameters that resulted in a progressive decay of 
the resource – less abrupt than Stage 2, but closer to depletion relatively to Stage 1. 
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Results of Simulation of Stage 1 
The experimenter played by mimicking the harvesting behavior of the bot with 0.5 of greed.
 
 
Bot parameters (average greed of 0.5) 
 pa2873: greed = 0.3, greed spread = 0.4; 
 jo827: greed = 0.8, greed spread = 0; 
 td3149: greed = 0.4, greed spread = 0.3; 
 cm792: greed = 0.5, greed spread = 0. 
Resource parameters: regeneration rate of the pool = 2 x final pool size 
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Results of Simulation of Stage 2 
The experimenter harvested nothing from the resource to make sure the resource would deplete 
even if participants were cooperative to the maximum. 
 
 
Bot parameters (average greed of 0.5) 
 pa2873: greed = 0.7, greed spread = 1.2; 
 jo827: greed = 0.9, greed spread = 1.2; 
 td3149: greed = 0.75, greed spread = 1.2; 
 cm792: greed = 0.85, greed spread = 1.2. 
Resource parameters: regeneration rate of the pool = 1.5 x final pool size 
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Results of Simulation of Stage 3 (High Danger) 
The experimenter played by mimicking the harvesting behavior of the bot with 0.5 of greed. 
 
 
Bot parameters (average greed of 0.6) 
 pa2873: greed = 0.75, greed spread = 0; 
 jo827: greed = 0.8, greed spread = 0; 
 td3149: greed = 0.35, greed spread = 0; 
 cm792: greed = 0.5, greed spread = 0. 
Resource parameters: regeneration rate of the pool = 2 x final pool size 
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Measures of cooperation and efficiency 
The following measures were retrieved from  (Gifford & Aranda, n.d.) 
  
Individual Restraint 
1 – taking 0 fish 
0.5 – sustainable harvest pattern (with a regeneration rate of 2) 
0 – taking 1/N of the pool (too much) 
IR < 0 – little restraint 
(1- N) – taking all of the fishes for himself 
 
Group Restraint 
1 – full restraint, no harvester in the group took any fish 
0 – no restraint, harvesters as a group extinguished the resource taking 1/N of the fish each 
 
Individual Efficiency 
IE > 1 – taking less than the most efficient amount (preservationist strategy) 
1 – perfect efficiency 
0 < IE < 1 – stock unable to regenerate to original size after spawning 
0 –  taking 1/N of the pool (too much) 
IE < 0 – even greater inefficiency or greed 
 
Group Efficiency 
GE > 1 - underharvesting 
1 – perfect efficiency, group as a whole harvests exactly enough to allow full resource 
regeneration (no more and no less) 
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0 < GE < 1 – greed-based inefficiency 
0 – group exhausted the resource 
 
Note: IE for an individual fisher is computed differently when the resource is in danger or not 
of depletion. The resource is said to be in danger if it can not regenerate to its original size even 
if all harvesters take nothing (ranges from 1 to negative numbers). GE is also computed 
differently if the resource is in danger (ranges from 1 to 0) 
 
For additional details on the formulae for each measure of restraint – IR and GR – and 
efficiency – IE and GE – see Gifford & Hine, (1997) 
 
